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1. Introduction 
The flood and nuclear disaster in Fukushima affected not only the population 
living in the north east of Japan, but rather corroborated the idea of a ‘green’ and 
‘sustainable’ development in policy, education and economy. This event exem-
plified the risks resulting from nuclear energy and a potential phase out and 
served to drive the growing awareness of environmental and social issues, thus 
bringing the debate on sustainable development to a temporary climax. 
In his meta-review on climate economics Heal (2009) asks for “what do we 
have to assume to make an economic case for prompt and significant action to 
reduce greenhouse gas emission?” While natural scientists commonly justify 
intervention as a way of preventing environmental harm, the economic perspec-
tive is diverse and partly contrary to that of natural scientists. It is not just that 
there is uncertainty and a lack of knowledge as to the right policy and the appro-
priate procedure when implementing sustainable development, but rather a 
wrong approach is frequently put forward. Barbier (2011), for example, claims 
that institutional rigidities and transaction costs are the most formidable barriers 
which tend to reinforce a resource-based development. In theory and practice 
multilayered questions remain open. In view of the urgency of (economically) 
sustainable development, specialized knowledge is absolutely imperative. 
In order to contribute to this complex issue a closer consideration of the lat-
est developments are summarized. The trend towards economic sustainable de-
velopment has been observable for about two decades and is mainly attributable 
to two reasons. On the one hand, a political motivation in conjunction with a 
steadily growing influence of non-governmental organizations (NGO) plays a 
key role, and on the other, this trend has been identified by private and public 
companies as an economically viable area. 
With the publication of the Brundtland Report in 1987, the notion of ‘sus-
tainable development’ was phrased for the first time. Subsequent policy efforts 
date back to the United Nations Conferences on Environment and development 
in Rio de Janeiro (1992) or the Conference of the Parties in Kyoto (1997). A 
paradigm change was launched and the incorporation of sustainable criteria in 
policy, education and economy became widespread. Following the commonly 
used definition of the Brundtland commission the aim is a “development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future gener-
ations to meet their own needs.” One way of achieving these aims is the trans-
formation of the energy sector from conventional resources to renewable energy. 
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This inevitably involves political guidelines and regulatory frameworks that 
prompt companies – in particular in the energy sector – to invest in and develop 
renewable energy resources. Examples are EU directives containing binding ref-
erence targets for gross inland energy consumption from renewable energies1 or 
the German Renewable Energy Source Act (Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz - 
EEG)2 that came into force in 2000 and has since been copied by several Euro-
pean economies. 
The economic intention to pursue sustainable business strategies can be jus-
tified in different ways. Minimizing the consumption of resources reduces costs 
in general; from a marketing perspective a ‘sustainable image’ could lead to in-
creased customer demand and lastly a consideration of environmental and social 
issues can reduce risks and could minimize legal accusation. 
Financing the implementation of sustainable strategies or the transformation 
of the energy sector is one of the most challenging issues confronting us. In or-
der to implement the energy concept of the German government, for example, 
additional investments of approximately € 550 billion are necessary up to 2050 
(BMWi, 2012). The tight timeframe, the enormous amount of money that has to 
be invested to realize relevant projects, the high grade of uncertainty regarding 
the climate, global political development and the remaining amount of fossil en-
ergy resources are the main reasons for perceived financing constraints. 
In this cumulative dissertation the author takes on tackles the question as to 
what initiatives or means can help to shed light on the complexity of economic 
sustainable development. In doing so, the focus is on a capital market. Analyz-
ing capital markets is relevant for two reasons. First, the aim that policy initia-
tive pursues. The idea of political guidelines or regulatory frameworks is, for 
example, to foster private investments. Political initiatives target on raising the 
attractiveness of investments or reducing the risk investors have to bear. There-
                                                     
1  Directive 2001/77/EC quotes “[…] the need to promote renewable energy sources as a 
priority measure given that their exploitation contributes to environmental protection 
and sustainable development“. 
2  EEG, §1 Section 1, “The purpose of this Act is to facilitate a sustainable development of 
energy supply, particularly for the sake of protecting our climate and the environment, 
[…] “. 
 
3 
 
 
fore, by analyzing capital markets, a link between those initiatives and the per-
ception of capital markets could be revealed. Second, in order to finance growth 
and development, companies need to invest. A higher company value or a re-
duced risk perceived by capital market participants makes it easier for these 
companies to obtain finance via capital markets. Determining a link between 
policy initiatives and capital markets perception allows for a potential valuation 
of the initiatives. 
The three stand-alone papers of this dissertation focus on the question of 
whether regulatory changes or (voluntary) disclosures impact on corresponding 
companies. This contributes to the strand of research on how to implement a 
sustainable economic development. In particular, this work addresses the ques-
tion of whether capital markets value (voluntary) announcements or unexpected 
events which concern information that can affect an economic sustainable strat-
egy. Two measures are under consideration: a company’s market capitalization 
(MC) and a company’s (systematic) risk. The market capitalization reflects the 
present value of a company’s future cash flows. A change in that parameter in-
dicates that the capital markets have modified their forecast of company’s future 
cash flows or the corresponding investor’s required rate of return. The systemat-
ic risk (in the Capital Asset Pricing Model labeled as the beta factor) assesses 
the sensitivity of company returns to market returns in general. Estimating these 
two variables can lead to conclusions about the interaction of economic sustain-
able development and capital markets perception. 
Two industry sectors which are assigned an important role in the success of 
economic sustainable development are addressed in this cumulative dissertation. 
These industries include the energy sector, comprising conventional and renew-
able energy generation, and the financial industry. The (renewable) energy in-
dustry is undergoing a cruel transformation process, which started a decade ago 
and will last for more than a couple of decades. However, existing technologies 
for power generation from renewable resources and energy distribution are still 
insufficient to establish growing markets. The reasons for the transformation are 
manifold, but among them, there is one main driver. The development of the 
renewable energy industry is strongly politically promoted. Without political 
support or benevolent subsidies, renewable energy could not compete with 
cheap energy generated from conventional resources. The perceived dependency 
of the renewable energy industry provides emits a suitable out-of-sample analy-
sis. 
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The second industry I will analyze is the financial industry. Project finance 
as a method of funding large infrastructure, energy or industry projects has be-
come more important over the past decade. The role of the private financial sec-
tor, in particular, plays a predominant role here. Through their decision to fi-
nance a project, financial institutions make a significant contribution to whether 
projects are launched or not. This crucial role puts the financial institutions in-
dustry under increasing public pressure to consider the potential environmental 
and social harm of the project. This constitutes a link between public awareness 
and economic sustainable development. A second reason is that environmental 
and social issues bear a ‘new’ class of risk which considerably affects the suc-
cess or the failure of the project. A growing awareness of environmental and so-
cial issues on the part of by financial institutions could help to minimize these 
risk factors and, thereby, reduce the risk of a credit default. 
The results and the implications of this dissertation contribute on the one 
hand to theoretical findings relating to economic sustainable development and 
on the other include some suggestions for practitioners. Theoretical findings 
contribute to the gap in literature dealing with the coherency between economic 
sustainable development and capital market perception. From a practitioner’s 
point of view, the papers include suggestions for three groups of interest. First, 
for managers of public companies in the (renewable) energy or the financial in-
dustry, the results indicate whether and how a company’s market value and the 
systematic risk shifts if political decisions regarding supporting frameworks and 
fixed subsidies are announced or events such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster 
occur. The timing of equity issues could be one implication of these results. Se-
cond, the results suggest to politicians that shaping reliable and stable frame-
works could ensure returns and reduce the risk of affected companies. This cor-
roborates methods of start-up financing for industries such as the renewable en-
ergy sector. Third, investors looking out for attractive investments regarding re-
turn and risk are encouraged to invest in those companies. 
This cumulative dissertation comprises three stand-alone papers. Each of the 
papers includes an introduction, a data and methodology part, description of the 
results and concluding remarks. All papers have already been published or ac-
cepted for publication. The following part of the introduction summarizes each 
paper and outlines in brevity respective key elements of the three single papers. 
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Regulatory changes and market reactions – the European renewable 
energy market 
This paper investigates whether potential policy changes impact on the return or 
the (systematic) risk of young renewable energy companies in Europe. In the 
recent past manifold reports and conventions have revealed the urgent need for a 
transformation of the energy sector from the utilization of conventional to re-
newable resources (e.g. Conference of the Parties, Kyoto, 1997; Stern Review 
on the Economics of Climate Change, 2006). The discussion about the climate 
change and the involved controversy on the development of climate protection 
schemes has become increasingly important. In this debate positive voices pos-
tulate the urgent need to support initiatives, whereas negative arguments stress 
the high costs or ineffectiveness of the initiatives. Political directives intended to 
push forward the transformation of the European energy sector from the utiliza-
tion of conventional to renewable resources can be seen as regulatory acts. The-
se market interventions prompt the debate about the impact on the risk/return 
profile of the companies affected. 
As a first step the study applies an event study approach in order to examine 
the impact of regulatory announcements on the company´s market value. 
Twelve regulatory events which occurred between 2006 and 2010 are examined. 
These events comprise announcements by e.g. the European Commission, the 
European Council or the Parliament. The tested sample includes eleven renewa-
ble energy companies located in Europe. Each of the companies was backed by 
venture capital or private equity when it went public. In a second step a time-
varying beta calculation is used to determine the changes in the systematic stock 
return risk of the company. A rolling OLS regression is used to compute daily 
beta factors for the period from 2006 to 2010. 
The results reveal positive abnormal returns, in particular when the an-
nouncement deals with the EU-climate package or the following Directive 
2009/28/EC. Announcements during the initial stage of the development of a 
Directive do not affect capital markets so much, whereas announcements con-
cerning (final) approvals are strongly perceived by capital markets. Results in 
the second part of the analysis indicate a decreasing shift of the beta factor for 
the announcements with statistically significant positive abnormal returns, i.e. 
the more binding announcements. This proves a negative correlation between 
abnormal stock returns and beta variation. As no announcement is perceived sta-
tistically negative by capital markets (i.e. no announcement shows significant 
negative abnormal returns) a correlation between negative abnormal returns and 
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an increasing beta factor cannot be proven, but results slightly indicate this rela-
tionship. 
Implications derived from the results highlight the importance of policy ini-
tiatives and the corresponding regulatory announcements in Europe. Positive 
regulation announcements reduce systematic risk and provide attractive invest-
ment possibilities. 
 
The nuclear disaster in Japan and expected cost of capital for German 
energy providers: A note from an efficient market perspective 
The nuclear disaster in Fukushima has not only led to a much more intense de-
bate on the future of nuclear energy as a bridging technology, but also raises the 
question of the cost of a nuclear phase-out for the energy providers. An ad-
vanced transition to an energy system primary based on renewable energies re-
quires large additional investments – in particular from the big energy providers 
– in new technologies, distribution systems or energy storage. These investments 
need to be financed. The rate of the transition is highly dependent on policy tar-
get settings or the impending phase-out. A quicker transition rate is accompa-
nied by increased costs. The energy providers do not yet have the appropriate 
technology at hand. Thus, costs for advanced technology development or cor-
nerstone projects raise the amount that has to be invested by i.e. energy provider. 
A so far neglected dimension in the debate is based on the cost of capital. 
Cost of capital must be considered in order to finance future investments in re-
newable energy technology and distribution systems. These costs – in particular 
when considering stock markets – are priced by the (systematic) risk perceived 
by capital markets. This study, therefore, phrases two research questions. First, 
do equity shareholders suffer an immediate loss after the nuclear disaster of Fu-
kushima? Second, does the (systematic) risk and, therewith, the cost of capital 
perceived by capital market participants increase? These questions allow infer-
ences to the question as to what this implies for future financing costs. 
The methodology section comprises two steps. Beginning with the first re-
search question, an event study approach is applied, estimating abnormal returns 
for German energy providers following the nuclear disaster of Fukushima. In 
order to elaborate the second research question a rolling beta coefficient for 
German energy companies is estimated.  
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The results suggest that capital market perception clearly distinguishes be-
tween energy providers operating nuclear power plants and energy providers 
which do not include nuclear power in their energy portfolio. German energy 
providers operating nuclear power plants suffer a loss of shareholder value and 
experience a remarkable increase in the beta factor (i.e. cost of capital). By con-
trast, a provider without nuclear power plants in its energy portfolio shows a 
slightly decrease of future cost of capital. This suggests increasing financing 
costs for future projects for energy providers with nuclear power plants. Both 
effects (the loss in shareholder value and increasing cost of capital) impact the 
financial performance of these power companies and limit their ability to make a 
significant contribution to investment in energy policy. A potential implication 
for public policy is the cost of the uncertainty about a potential phase-out is. 
 
Sustainable Project Finance, the Adoption of Equator Principles, and 
Shareholder Value Effects 
This paper deals with financial institutions and their voluntary adoption of the 
Equator Principles (EP). The EP are a code of conduct for the banking industry, 
launched in 2003, that address environmental and social issues in project fi-
nance. Today over 70 financial institutions worldwide adopt the EP, including 
the global players of the financial industry. An increasing worldwide project fi-
nance volume and a growing awareness of economic sustainable development 
raise the question of whether a more serious consideration of those issues en-
hances the firm value and improves company’s performance. While in literature 
this has partly been addressed, this study contributes and extends this existing 
strand in the following ways. First, it analyzes whether the impact of the EP has 
changed empirically between 2003 and 2011. Second, the performance of adopt-
ing financial institutions is investigated. Third, trends in the project finance 
market are identified. 
The analysis is divided into two steps. In the first part an event study meth-
odology considering the market model and conditional variance is applied. The 
second part comprises an MLA League Table Analysis comparing short-term 
and long-term performance of financial institutions adopting EP and non-
adopting financial institutions. Finally, the effects of EP-compliant projects on 
the project finance market are analyzed. 
The results show that financial institutions adopting the EP in the earlier pe-
riod (2003 -2006) gained positive abnormal returns, while all others did not 
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cause any capital market reactions. A further subsample classified by region in-
dicates a slightly positive abnormal return for financial institutions from OECD 
countries. These results indicate that the reputational risk hypothesis is one of 
the main drivers in adopting a voluntary code of conduct such as the Equator 
Principles. Applying the League Table Analysis results suggests that adopters 
outperform non-adopters in terms of number of projects and market share. Alt-
hough results could be slightly biased by the market entry of non reporting fi-
nancial institutions, as for example the State Bank of India, results are assumed 
to be robust. Focusing on the project finance market, the results reveal a steady 
quota for EP-compliant projects in western countries, but a dramatic decrease in 
non OECD countries. This reinforces the reputational risk hypothesis, but alt-
hough results here could be biased by the market entry of non-reporting finan-
cial institutions. 
The implication is that it is beneficial for financial institutions to adopt vol-
untary codes of conduct such as the EP and within a broader scope they should 
be encouraged to foster and adopt responsible identities. From a policy perspec-
tive, results implicate that developing standard settings pertaining to environ-
mental and social issues in the financial sector should be encouraged. 
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2. Regulatory Changes and Market Reactions – 
The European Renewable Energy Market 
 
 
Abstract 
Political directives intended to push forward the transformation of the European 
energy sector from the utilization of conventional to renewable resources can be 
seen as regulatory acts and therefore give rise to the debate about the impact on 
the risk/return profile of the companies affected. This paper investigates whether 
political decisions influence the risk/return-profile of young technology-based 
companies from the cleantech industry. As a first step we apply an event study 
approach in order to examine the impact of regulatory announcements on the 
company´s market value. As a second step a time-varying beta calculation is 
used to determine the changes in the systematic stock return risk of the compa-
ny. The results concord with theoretical findings in general. The stricter the reg-
ulation, the more negative the company´s abnormal stock return and the higher 
the systematic risk, and vice versa. 
 
Trillig J. 2012. Regulatory changes and market reactions – the European renew-
able energy market. International Journal of Entrepreneurship and Small 
Business 15(1): 116-129. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Energy markets are shifting from using natural resources to renewable energies 
(RE). Existing technologies in the renewable energy sector, however, are insuf-
ficient to accomplish climate and ecological aims. Over the past decades policy 
makers have passed several political directives that have led to increased entre-
preneurial activity. Young technology-based companies are focusing their re-
search and development programs in particular on energy generation, energy 
storage and intelligent energy allocation. Conventional power generation, how-
ever, is still cheaper than transforming solar or wind energy into electrical pow-
er. European countries are launching economic development schemes to boost 
renewable energies and finally achieve grid parity. This situation gives reason to 
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investigate whether political decisions influence the risk/return-profile of young 
technology-based companies from the cleantech industry and how the effect im-
pacts young companies. Young companies in particular struggled with the 2008 
financial crisis and were exposed to high risk. To determine this argument we 
analyze the cost of capital before and after the crisis. We expect to find that the 
announcement of initializing positive political frameworks leads to increased 
technological development accompanied by attractive risk/return-profiles and 
therefore provides valuable opportunities for venture capital investments. 
In this paper we conduct our analysis in two steps. First, we examine wheth-
er political decisions regarding renewable energies are taken into consideration 
by capital markets. Since there is evidence that this is the case, we ask how they 
influence the valuation of the company. Second, we assess how the systematic 
stock return risk of the company performs over time, or rather around the an-
nouncement date. Our sample includes companies from the entire European re-
newable energy sector (wind, solar, hydro …). We assume a predominant share 
of venture capital within the financial structure of the companies in the pre IPO 
stage. This is postulated since we determine the analysis in order to examine 
profitable early stage alternatives. When analyzing the sample, we use the event 
study methodology as shown in MacKinlay (1997). The market model is used to 
measure expected performance of stock market reactions; cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) serve as evidence for event-induced valuation effects in security 
returns. The events under review concern political decisions regarding regulato-
ry frameworks for the energy market. We focus on decisions made at European 
level. Significant CAR indicate that capital market participants attach im-
portance to the announcement of political decisions. Our findings indicate more 
significant positive CAR when European directives are enacted than when they 
are announced and we interpret this as an indicator that capital markets do not 
completely anticipate legal acts. In a second step we estimate systematic risk in 
form of beta coefficients over time. On the basis of the variance and covariance 
of a compromised portfolio we highlight shifts in the risk valuation of the com-
pany. Results show that changes in the political framework for the energy sector 
promoting renewable energies lead to lower risk valuation for these companies. 
We examine whether the capital market reacts to the announcement of new 
policy frameworks promoting the renewable energy sector and beyond that leads 
to a reduction in the systematic risk of the companies. These impacts, partly an-
ticipated by the capital market, provide attractive risk/return-profiles for compa-
nies in the renewable energy sector and favor early stage financing. 
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This paper is organized as follows: section 2.2 presents an introduction to 
the development of the renewable energy market and the political intention in 
Europe. In section 2.3 the applied methodology and the data is explained. The 
results found are discussed in section 2.4 and finally section 2.5 closes with a 
brave conclusion. 
2.2 Background / the European Renewable Energy 
Market 
The discussion about the climate change and the ensuing controversy on the de-
velopment of climate protection schemes has gained more and more importance 
over the past decades. The White Paper published by the European Union (EU) 
in 1997 contained binding reference targets3 for gross inland energy consump-
tion from renewable energies for the first time. These targets were increased by 
Directive 2001/77/EC in 2001 and recently again by Directive 2009/28/EC in 
2009. These efforts are a response to the manifold reports (e.g. Stern Report 
2006, IPPC 2007) imploring politicians, economists and researchers to push for 
the transformation away from conventional energy generation to renewable en-
ergy. 
Existing technologies in the renewable energy sector, however, are insuffi-
cient to accomplish climate and ecological aims. The production costs of RE 
still exceed the costs of energy generated from oil or coal. The transformation of 
solar energy into electricity costs approximately  0.52 - 0.62 €/kWh, wind ener-
gy 0.096 - 0.180 €/kWh dependent on on/offshore installations, biomass 0.096 
€/kWh, whereas conventional resources come to 0.033 €/kWh for coal, 0.042 
€/kWh for gas and 0.050 - 0.085 €/kWh for nuclear power (European 
Commission, 2008; Wissel et al., 2008). Hence, the promotion of renewable en-
ergies through public schemes is essential in order to raise the technological lev-
el onto a competitive basis with conventional energy production. Jacobsson & 
Bergek (2004) argue that the prevailing issue is not the potential of renewable 
energy technologies, but the realization and the transformation of this potential. 
They discuss the transformation of the energy sector from conventional re-
sources to renewable energies and enumerate challenges which arise. Three cri-
teria are identified which are distinctive for this sector and have to be taken into 
account when thinking about a transformation. First, the energy sector is huge, 
                                                     
3  The White paper set a target of 12% of gross inland energy consumption from renewa-
ble energies for the EU-15 by 2010, of which electricity would represent 22.1%. 
  12 
so that transformation will take a long time even with high growth rates. Second, 
new market formation is a widely debated topic and there is no one solution. 
Third, a well-established system of energy producers and energy providers al-
ready exists which fights against replacement by new companies. 
The different directives enacted by the EU require national governments to 
implement promotion schemes in each member state. Every EU country imple-
ments different promotion strategies and some of them seem to be more favora-
ble than others with regard to the proportion of RE. Due to different national 
frameworks (e.g. definition of installed RE, geographical and technical differ-
ences) there is no obvious superiority of any strategy and the success depends on 
the adjustment and the integration of the promotion schemes within each 
framework (Reiche and Bechberger, 2004). The effectiveness in terms of reduc-
ing greenhouse gas (GHG) and the cost efficiency of these programs is widely 
discussed. Without expanding the controversy about efficiency too far, we want 
to enumerate some arguments: the efficiency of segmented market regulation 
with an Emission Trading System (ETS) and a non-ETS sector (Böhringer et al., 
2009) and the potential excess costs for binding renewable energy targets 
(Boeters and Koornneef, 2010). 
There is much evidence that regulation affects a company´s systematic stock 
return risk and therefore the risk/return profile. Riddick (1992) shows theoretical 
and empirical results that suggest a diminution of systematic risk in a regulated 
firm compared to an unregulated firm. In contrast, Havenner et al. (2001) exam-
ine an increase in systematic risk during periods of regulatory change. In con-
nection with the privatization of public utilities in the UK, Parker (2003) argues 
that the regulatory risk depends on the variable types of regulation and the ap-
plied practice. Alexander & Irwin (1996), on the other hand, show that the rate 
on return regulation4 induces a lower risk relative to price caps5 because of a 
higher guarantee of profits. Cambini & Rondi (2009) analyze whether invest-
ment decisions of European energy utilities during the period 1997 to 2007 
change with the regulatory framework. They find more investment activity in 
connection with incentive regulation than under rate on return regulation. Final-
ly, Paleari & Redondi (2005) endorse the results from Peltzman (1976) and 
show that the company´s overall risk correlates with the regulation of the com-
                                                     
4  Rate on return regulation constrains the interest yields of the invested money. 
5  Price cap regulation limits the highest price for a good. 
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pany. The stricter the regulation, the more negative the company´s abnormal re-
turn and the higher the systematic risk, and vice versa. 
A decrease in systematic risk – resulting from positive regulatory frame-
works – in young technology-based companies could be an attractive incentive 
for investors. In particular, early stage financiers could value the modified 
risk/return profiles and hence be induced to expand their investments. An active 
investment environment during early stage financing is widely assumed to be an 
indicator for disproportionately high innovation and development. This situation 
could be helpful to overcome the transformation difficulties of the energy sector 
in Europe. 
The paper includes two further preconditions. In view of the 2008 financial 
crisis, we subdivide the analysis into a pre- and a post-crisis period. Small and 
innovative companies in particular struggled during the crisis and were exposed 
to high risk. Hence, the impact of regulation before and after the crisis should be 
compared. The sample contains solely companies which were joined by a ven-
ture capital company during the pre-IPO phase. Since venture capital companies 
are specialized in young innovative branches, we expect our results to be rein-
forced through this precondition. 
The purpose of this analysis is to investigate whether announcements of 
changes in promotion schemes for renewable energy on a European level affect 
systematic risk and thus lead to variations in the risk profile of RE-companies. 
Furthermore we want to fill the existing gap in research related to regulation and 
promotion schemes for young technology-based companies, in this case repre-
sented by companies from the renewable energy sector. In line with Peltzman’s 
theory adopted here, we expect risk exposure to decline in companies which are 
included in promotion schemes and therefore offer an attractive risk/return-
profile for investors. In our analysis we assume that softer regulation is equiva-
lent to generating positive frameworks for the renewable energy branch and 
hence positive abnormal returns are expected when appropriate announcements 
are published. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 The Data 
The identification of the exact event date regarding regulatory events begins 
with a definition of a regulatory event. For this we follow the definition used by 
Binder (1985) which describes activities following from government and par-
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liamentary intervention as a regulatory event. The determination of renewable 
energy rates by the European Commission is for example a well-defined regula-
tory event. 
Table 1: List of Regulatory Events 
No. Event date Description 
1 8 Mar 2006 The European Commission (EC) published the “Green book“ with its objective to 
assure a sustainable, competitive and safe energy supply within the EU. 
2 24 Mar 2006 Spring summit of the European Council; European Heads of State and Heads of Gov-
ernment agree to the proposal of the Green book. 
3 10 Jan 2007 The idea was then taken over by the European Commission in January 2007 in its 
Communication on a Renewable Energy Road Map [COM(2006) 848 final]. 
4 9 Mar 2007 Spring summit of the European Council; European Heads of State and Heads of Gov-
ernment gave their green light to this binding target at the March 2007 Summit. 
5 19 Oct 2007 The EC published a concept for a Directive that contains a change from the introduc-
tion of a GHG trading scheme to an introduction of fixed targets for renewable ener-
gies in 2020. This Directive should be presented in Jan 2008. 
6 22 Jan 2008 The European Commission published its proposal for a Directive on the promotion of 
the use of energy from renewable energy [COM(2008) 19 final]. 
7 12 Dec 2008 The European Council enacts the EU-climate-package.
8 17 Dec 2008 The European parliament passes the EU-climate-package with overwhelming majority.
9 6 Apr 2009 The Directive 2009/28/EC was adopted by the Council.
10 23 Apr 2009 Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council; published on 5. 
Jun 2009 and hence became law. 
11 25 Jun 2009 The Directive 2009/28/EC entered into force.
12 18 Jun 2010 The recast of Directive 2010/31/EU on the Energy Performance of Buildings (EPBD) 
was published in the Official Journal of the EU, amending Directive 2002/91/EC. The 
recast introduces for the first time a European-wide definition of ‘nearly zero energy 
buildings’. 
 
In order to identify the event data we browsed the database of Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, one of the leading daily newspapers for politics, business 
and economics in Germany. The research timeframe starts on 1 Jan 2006 and 
ends on 30 Nov 2010. We gathered any information dealing with the renewable 
energy sector and political decisions on a European level. In order to identify the 
first date at which the information was published, we crosschecked the events 
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with the press release database of important European renewable energy associa-
tions.6 A list with the selected events is given in Table 1 below. 
The search for companies matching the stated preconditions was based on a 
selection from Bloomberg New Energy Finance (NEF), expanded by companies 
found through personal research. The Bloomberg NEF list included companies 
which match the following criteria: renewable energy (solar, wind, biomass, ge-
othermal), completed IPO, located within the European Union. No filter was 
available for the proportion of the overall sales volume of the company generat-
ed by renewable energy, i.e. the sample includes firms that do not generate reve-
nues exclusively from the renewable energy sector, but at least more than 50% 
from this sector. Neither was there a filter to determine whether the company 
was backed by venture capital or private equity when it went public. Due to the 
absence of this option, we reviewed the IPO prospectuses or contacted the inves-
tor relations department of each of the companies. 
Table 2: List of Sample Companies 
Company Country Branch VC-Company 
Aleo solar AG GER Solar Hannover Finanz 
Bosch Solar Energy AG* GER Solar Ventizz, equitrust, nwk nordwest Kapitalbeteiligungs-
gesellschaft 
Centrosolar AG GER Solar Heliad Equity 
Conergy AG GER Solar Grazia Equity, Capital Stage  
Hansen Transmission Int. BEL Wind N/A 
ISRA Vision AG GER Solar N/A 
Meyer + Burger AG SUI  Solar  N/A 
Q-Cells AG GER Solar Apax Partners, IBG Sachsen-Anhalt, DKB Wagnis-
kapital  
Schmack Biogas AG GER Biomass  BayBG, S-Refit, SAM Private Equity 
Theolia SA FRA  Wind  N/A 
Vergnet SA FRA  Wind  N/A 
* Founded in 1997 under Ersol Solar Energy AG, on 12 Aug 2008 acquired by Robert Bosch GmbH. 
 
                                                     
6  European Renewable Energy Council (EREC) and International Energy Agency (IEA). 
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Our sample (Table 2) consists of eleven companies from the Cleantech sec-
tor (solar, wind, biomass). Seven companies come from the solar branch, three 
from the wind sector and only one company belongs to the biomass sector. Most 
of them (seven) are German, two French one each Swiss and Belgian. The high 
percentage of German solar companies is due to the extensive subsidies in this 
sector. 
For the companies located in Germany we could use data provided by the 
German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association (BVK). The daily share 
price was taken from Datastream for a period from 1 Jan 2006 to 30 Nov 2010 
and used to calculate the daily returns of each company. 
2.3.2 The Event-Study Methodology 
When analyzing the sample, we use the event study methodology as shown in 
MacKinlay (1997). Abnormal returns are used as an indicator to estimate wheth-
er there are market reactions to regulatory announcements. As a measure for ab-
normal stock returns the daily returns of the companies were compared to esti-
mated expected market returns as follows: 
)( ,,, tititi RERAR   ,     (2.1) 
where Ri,t is the stock return of company i on day t and E(Ri,t) is the expected 
stock return on day t respectively. As a benchmark for the expected return the 
market model, as shown below, is applied (Binder, 1985; Dnes et al., 1998). The 
required alpha and beta are estimated from an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression of the daily market returns. The daily returns of the market are repre-
sented by daily returns of EUROSTOXX 50.The random error term is represent-
ed by ei,t: 
titmiiti eRRE ,,, *)(        (2.2) 
The OLS regression is applied for the estimation period of 120 days before 
the event. A cap of 30 days between estimation period and announcement date 
prevents any influence from the event on the estimated returns. The abnormal 
returns are summed across the days of the event period (t1 to t2). That is given by 
  2 1 ,t tt tii ARCAR       (2.3) 
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Cumulative averaged abnormal returns (CAAR) are the average across all 
companies and zero in the event-period is the null hypothesis to be tested. This 
indicates that there is no impact of the announcements on the stock prices. 
  Ni iCARNCAAR 11      (2.4) 
Testing the significance, we apply a standard t-test. We assume normally 
distributed returns with zero mean. 
Given that testing regulatory events with an event study entails some diffi-
culties, we apply two more test statistics to ensure the correctness of our results. 
First, Boehmer et al. (1991) discuss whether there is an event-induced increase 
in the variance of returns. They demonstrate that typically the null hypothesis is 
too often rejected for reasons of event-induced variance and suggest a cross-
sectional test applied to normalized event-period returns. Second, we use a mod-
ified t-test as presented in Johnson (1978). Since the assumption of independent, 
identically distributed observations is not unquestioned in this case, the modified 
variable reduces the effect of possible population skewness. 
Earlier in this paper we discussed the problems connected with the applica-
bility of event studies for regulatory events. It is therefore important to mention 
some assumptions we postulated in order to achieve results that are as unbiased 
as possible (Lamdin, 2001). Compared to events such as acquisition announce-
ments, for example, it is very difficult to determine the exact date of regulatory 
changes. These difficulties lead to a dilution of the overall results. Given the 
typically long process of enacting legal regulations, information usually appears 
on the market before the actual event occurs. The event study exhibits less pow-
erful results (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985) and could wrongly deny the im-
pact of an event. To avoid this mistake, several event windows are used. This 
enables us to verify for each event when the information entered the market. The 
length of the event window varies between -20 and -1 before the event and 1 to 
20 days after. 
The sample taken as a basis for the analysis contains different companies 
from the same sector. Other events than the ones used in our analysis could also 
influence the returns in the same way and lead to an “industry effect”. Thus, it is 
important to distinguish between the analyzed effect and an impact that could 
result from any other event. Otherwise we may obtain significant AR, not only 
because of the underlying event but also as a result of the unconsidered event. 
To preclude this we carefully study the market behavior during the event dates. 
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In line with the Peltzman (1976) model and the Paleari & Redondi model 
(2005), we expect that announcements concerning the creation of positive 
frameworks for the renewable energy sector in Europe will lead to positive ab-
normal returns for the companies in this sector. 
Since the announcements do not always include specific statements and Eu-
ropean Directives first have to be transformed into national law which may en-
tail some changes in content, we do not expect each event to lead to significantly 
positive AR. 
2.3.3 The Change in Beta 
In capital asset pricing theory the β-factor stands for systematic risk and de-
scribes the percentage of the covariance (cov()) of the return of company i to the 
return of the market index and the variance (var()) of the market index, as 
shown in the expression below: 
)var(
),cov(
m
mi
i R
RR       (2.5) 
Ri stands for the return of company i, Rm for the market return. 
Abnormal returns and beta variation show a positive correlation. Therefore 
we calculate a daily beta for the time period from 1 Jan 2006 to 30 Nov 2010, 
including information from 60 days before and 60 days after each day. We 
therefore estimate a 120-day β-factor for each day in the time period. We expect 
that generating positive frameworks for the development of young technology-
based companies will lead to an increase in AR and therefore decrease the over-
all risk for these companies. This could be equalized with a decrease of the β-
factor and therefore influence the cost of capital. 
2.4 The Empirical Analysis 
The event study methodology implies several difficulties when applied to regu-
latory announcements. Our results show reactions from the capital market to the 
regulatory event dates of a statistical significance at 5% level for eight events 
and at 1% level for five events. This gives reason to argue that it is possible to 
measure the influence of political or regulatory decisions on companies from the 
renewable energy sector. However, we are not able to exclude the effects on the 
sample of the events we did not consider. 
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We used event windows of different length for two reasons in order to avoid 
any misconceptions. First, the determination of the exact event date following 
regulatory announcements proves somewhat difficult so that we want to make 
sure that we capture the market reaction even if we set a slightly biased event 
date. If the announcement appeared on the market earlier or later and had an im-
pact on the stock market returns, the event windows with the longer periods 
show significant results whereas the small windows do not show any reaction. 
This could be an indication that we should verify and recalculate the market re-
action. Second, it is not clear how quickly the information reaches the market. 
Political decisions on a European level are typically not as close to the market as 
national decisions. Therefore event windows of different lengths enable us to 
crosscheck if there was no market reaction to the event date or if the duration of 
information diffusion took some days. 
The analysis shows (Table 3) that the results of the different event windows 
regarding one certain event do not differ significantly. Even event 1 shows dif-
ferent tendencies among the windows before and after the event, i.e. it switches 
the algebraic sign on more than one occasion. The remaining events show al-
most the same tendency in the different event windows. If we look at the ex-
planatory power of the 5-day event window after the event, there is strong evi-
dence that this window includes all market reactions. Only one window (no. 10) 
does not have the same algebraic sign as the windows including more days after 
the event. This indicates an adequate determination of the event dates and allows 
us to use these dates and the resulting effects for the following analysis. 
The results indicate abnormal returns for events 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 with a statisti-
cal significance at the 1% level. As event no. 3 does not show significant ab-
normal stock returns in the 5- or 10-day event window we cannot exclude any 
other effect that causes the abnormal returns in the 20-day window and for this 
reason we exclude event no. 3 from the following analysis. Each of the remain-
ing events deals with the EU-climate-package7 and the following Directive 
2009/28/EC. On 12 Dec 2008 the EU-climate-package was approved by the Eu-
ropean Council and the cumulative abnormal return was equal to 9.04 percent in 
the 5-day window and 13.29 percent in the 10-day window. Similar results 
emerged on 17 Dec 2008 when the European Parliament passed the EU-climate 
                                                     
7  The EU-climate-package aims to ensure that the EU will achieve its climate targets by 
2020: a 20% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, a 20% improvement in energy effi-
ciency and a 20% share for renewables in the EU energy mix. 
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package, with cumulative abnormal returns of 9.43% (5-day window) and 
14.02% (10-day window). When Directive 2009/28/EC was adopted by the 
Council on 6 Apr 2009 and passed by the EU Parliament and the Council on 23. 
Apr 2009, the CAR were lower and in one case even negative (2.59/-0.64, 
14.39/4.97). The agreement reached by the European Council and the European 
Parliament seem to be the most important decision as far as the market is con-
cerned. Initial steps in the development of a Directive on a European level do 
not effect capital markets reactions so much. 
Table 3: Cumulative Abnormal Stock Returns for the 5-, 10- and 20-day Event Window 
No. Date Cum. abnormal return [%] No. Date Cum. abnormal return [%] 
  5-day 10- day 20-day   5-day 10-day 20-day 
1 8 Mar 2006 2.34 -3.34* 5.02 7 12 Dec 2008 9.04** 13.29*** 20.08***
2 24 Mar 2006 2.40 6.85** 12.13 8 17 Dec 2008 9.43*** 14.02*** 15.97***
3 10 Jan 2007 4.67 4.30 17.09*** 9 6 Apr 2009 2.59 14.39*** 17.69***
4 9 Mar 2007 1.57 2.59* 2.55 10 23 Apr 2009 -0.64 4.97** 10.00***
5 19 Oct 2007 1.95 7.11 4.30 11 25 Jun 2009 0.66 1.38 -5.57 
6 22 Jan 2008 -0.23 -3.19 -13.52** 12 18 Jun 2010 4.23** 2.45 3.48 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Two further arguments also emerge from our analysis. First, there are no ab-
normal stock returns in the 5-day event window and only five abnormal return 
rates for all windows in the period from 2006 to mid-2008. But half of the 
events from the second part of the analysis show significant abnormal stock re-
turns in the 5-day window and, in addition, eleven abnormal return rates in all 
windows. This could be due to the fact that the market attaches greater im-
portance to the decisions of the European regulators and therefore reacts more 
strongly to changes. However, there is an alternative reason for this finding if 
we argue that the implications for the renewable energy branch arising from the 
first events do not have the same importance as the later events. Second, the fact 
that there are no abnormal stock returns in the 5-day event window in the period 
from 2006 to mid-2008, but three in the second part, points to the necessity for a 
speedier allocation of information about political decisions to the renewable en-
ergy sector. In particular, the event on 18 Jun 2010 shows AR in the 5-day win-
dow, but not in the 10- or 20-day window. This shows that the new information 
is fully anticipated within a five day period and does not affect later days. How-
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ever, the same alternative reason exists here as for the first finding if we consid-
er the different significance of the events for the companies. 
Figure 1 presents the time-varying beta-factors calculation from the equal-
weighted portfolio. The two dashed lines represent the beginning (1 Jan 2008) 
and the end (1 Jun 2009) of the economic crisis in 2008. We marked this period 
so that it is easier to compare the impact of regulatory decisions before and after 
the crisis. The five events before the crisis do not show a significant decrease in 
beta, even though event nos. 1, 2 and 4 indicate a slight decline in beta. This 
conforms to the significant positive abnormal stock returns showed in Table 3. 
 
 
Figure 1: Time-varying Beta of the Sample Companies from 2006 to End 2010 
The two events with high abnormal stock return rates (no. 9 and 10) show an 
additional significant decline in beta. Not only in short term but also in long 
term view, this decline continues and confirms the Peltzman theory that abnor-
mal returns and beta-factor variations are correlated. 
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On 18 Jun 2010 Directive 2010/31/EC was published in the Official Journal 
of the EU8. It contained for the first time a pan-European definition of “nearly 
zero energy buildings”. This regulation generated positive abnormal stock re-
turns and additionally a decrease in beta. Due to the end of the timeline we can-
not prove whether this decrease is consistent or if beta will rise again in the long 
term perspective. 
In order to determine whether beta level has changed over time we have to 
analyze the relatively high volatility in the pre-crisis period. One reason for the 
volatility in the beginning of the time period could be the lack of sufficient com-
panies. At the beginning of 2006 the sample contains 6 companies, but only 
three of them were listed long enough to calculate an estimation period. In mid-
2006 three new companies were listed and added to the sample, in Jun and Sep 
2007 the remaining two companies were included. Another reason could be that 
five out of the six companies included in the sample at the beginning belong to 
the solar branch. This branch was in trouble at this time because of a severe 
shortage of silicon. The solar boom in the first years of 2000 led to an enormous 
demand for silicon which could not be satisfied by the existing production ca-
pacity. The shortfall and the rising silicon price created high uncertainty for the 
entire market. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear tendency in 2007 towards beta between 0.7 and 
1.3. The period after the crisis shows a considerably less volatile beta-factor ex-
hibiting a constant decrease to between 0.8 and 0.5. Events nos.7-10 in particu-
lar have reference to the introduction of Directive 2009/28/EC and seem to 
cause and reinforce the decline of the beta-factor. Nevertheless, this decline is 
probably not solely attributable to the regulatory changes. Greater experience 
with these innovative technology companies on the part of the market and a 
broader acceptance of renewable energies by the public may also lead to a de-
crease in the risk perception. 
The results from the event study show that this methodology is an appropri-
ate measure for political or regulatory announcements concerning the renewable 
energy branch. Furthermore, the analysis indicates positive abnormal stock re-
turns accompanied by a diminution of the beta-factor when there is an occur-
rence of events with a positive influence on an economic framework. These re-
sults concord with the theoretical findings we discussed earlier in this paper. 
                                                     
8  Legal acts published in the Official Journal of the EU are binding and hence become 
law. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The transformation of the European energy market from conventional to renew-
able energies is a widely debated field in European policy. European policy 
makers are making various efforts to push this transformation forward. These 
political directives can be seen as regulation acts which lead to the debate about 
the impact on the risk/return profile of the companies affected. Existing work in 
this area is amended for the case of the renewable energy sector in Europe. 
We use a classic event study and a time-varying beta calculation and apply 
these methodologies to our sample. Our results reveal (i) the capital market 
shows significant reactions (in terms of abnormal stock returns) to regulatory 
announcements on a European level, (ii) these abnormal stock returns show a 
negative correlation to beta variations and (iii) abnormal stock returns are posi-
tive in case of positive announcements concerning the political framework. This 
indicates that policy makers have an influence on attractive risk and return pro-
portions of the analyzed companies. 
Our presumption for the examination is that the CAPM beta-factor is an ap-
propriate measure for systematic risk. With the methodology we tested twelve 
regulatory events in the period from 2006-10. Each of these events refers to reg-
ulatory announcements promoting renewable energies. The applied sample in-
cludes eleven companies from the renewable energy sector in Europe which 
were joined by a venture capital company during the pre-IPO phase. The re-
quirement of the involvement of a VC-company stems from the assumption that 
participation underpins the expected results. In a first step the event study ap-
proach shows the impact of the twelve events. In a second step we continue with 
a calculation of time-varying beta-factors. Due to the crisis in the middle of the 
analyzed time period we focus on the period before and after the 2008 crisis, so 
that the effect of the events to beta-factors could be compared. During the pre-
crisis period no valid conclusions can be made, since no abnormal stock returns 
occur and a high volatility in the beta calculation is observable for this period. 
The results after the crisis concord with the theoretical assumptions and prove a 
negative correlation between abnormal stock returns and beta variation. 
The implications of our results highlight the importance of political deci-
sions on the generation and establishment of incentive schemes for the devel-
opment of renewable energies in Europe. Positive regulation announcements 
reduce systematic risk and provide attractive investment possibilities. However, 
several limitations of this implication have to be mentioned. The size of the 
sample and the length of the analyzed period are small. In particular, the first 
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part of the period contains only few companies. Despite careful examination of 
the event dates, we cannot rule out other effects than those included. In an anal-
ysis over a longer period, this fact could dilute our results and should be taken 
into account. 
Developments of this paper mainly apply to the limitations mentioned 
above. To amplify the sample, companies without participation of a venture cap-
ital company could be included. Different alternatives could be the creation of 
subsamples for countries or branches. 
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3. Die Atomkatastrophe in Japan und die 
Kapitalkostenerwartungen für deutsche 
Energieerzeuger: Eine Note aus Sicht effi-
zienter Finanzmärkte 
 
 
Zusammenfassung 
Die Atomkatastrophe in Fukushima hat nicht nur für eine stark intensivierte De-
batte über die Zukunft der Kernenergie als Brückentechnologie auf dem Weg 
zur Versorgung durch regenerative Energieformen geführt, sondern auch die 
Frage nach den Kosten eines Atomausstiegs für die Stromkonzerne aufgewor-
fen. Ein in der Diskussion bislang vernachlässigter Aspekt richtet sich hierbei 
auf die Kapitalkosten, die anzusetzen sind, um künftige Investitionen in erneu-
erbare Energieerzeugung und leistungsstarke Netze zu finanzieren. Diese Kapi-
talkosten mit Blick auf über die Börse aufzunehmendes Eigenkapital werden 
insbesondere durch das vom Kapitalmarkt wahrgenommene (systematische) Ri-
siko determiniert. Für dieses Risiko deuten die hier ermittelten Ergebnisse auf 
einen sichtbaren Anstieg hin, was als Hinweis für höhere Finanzierungskosten 
zu interpretieren ist. 
 
Schiereck D, Trillig J. 2011. Die Atomkatastrophe in Japan und die Kapitalkos-
tenerwartungen für deutsche Energieversorger: Eine Note aus Sicht effi-
zienter Finanzmärkte. Zeitschrift für Umweltpolitik & Umweltrecht 2: 
133-144. 
 
3.1 Problemstellung 
Die Katastrophe um das Atomkraftwerk in Fukushima hat zu einer stark intensi-
vierten politischen Debatte über die Zukunft der Kernenergie in Deutschland 
geführt. Die bislang als notwendig bewertete Brückentechnologie auf dem Weg 
zu einer Energieversorgung durch regenerative Energieformen wird wahrschein-
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lich früher als ursprünglich vorgesehen vom Netz gehen. Die sich daraus ab-
zeichnenden finanziellen Konsequenzen lassen sich aus betriebswirtschaftlicher 
Sicht in kurzfristige Gewinnrückgänge und langfristige Kapitalkosteneffekte 
differenzieren. Kurzfristig werden die Gewinne der Stromkonzerne, die ihre 
Atomkraftwerke vom Netz nehmen müssen, durch diese Maßnahmen reduziert. 
Die unmittelbaren Gesamtfolgen eines Ausstiegs aus der Atomenergie für die 
betroffenen Unternehmen hängen u.a. aber auch davon ab, ob staatliche Ent-
schädigungszahlungen geleistet werden und wie zukünftig stärker ausgelastete 
Kohlekraftwerke wirtschaften. Von langfristiger Bedeutung sind vor allem die 
Konsequenzen auf die Eigenkapitalkosten der Stromkonzerne. Ob auch die In-
vestitionsvolumina durch eine frühere Energiewende betroffen sind, weil bspw. 
durch technologischen Fortschritt Wind- und Solarparks in späteren Jahren 
günstiger werden, steht bislang nicht im Blickpunkt der Debatte. 
Ein zügigerer Umstieg auf eine vorrangige Stromproduktion aus erneuerba-
ren Energien erfordert große Investitionen, für die insbesondere auch Eigenkapi-
tal zur Finanzierung benötigt wird. Die Kosten für dieses Eigenkapital richten 
sich nach den Risikoeinschätzungen der Investoren am Kapitalmarkt. Durch die 
nun wahrscheinlich frühere Abschaltung von Kernkraftwerken sinkt die Stabili-
tät der Einnahmen bei den Betreibern. Viele Technologien zur Erzeugung von 
Strom aus erneuerbaren Quellen besitzen noch keine langfristige Praxiserfah-
rung (Offshore-Windparks, Geothermie, Solarthermie etc.) und notwendige Er-
gänzungsinvestitionen für eine Energiewende in Hochspannungsüberlandleitun-
gen und Pumpspeicherkraftwerke verzögern sich durch den Widerstand von 
Bürgerinitiativen. Als Konsequenz für den plötzlichen Bedeutungsanstieg dieser 
zahlreichen Risikoquellen liegt die Vermutung nahe, dass Investoren in Strom-
versorger ihre Risikoeinschätzung ändern und deshalb zukünftig höhere Rendi-
ten auf ihr investiertes Eigenkapital fordern. 
Die Frage, ob ein vorzeitiger Atomausstieg zu einer Erhöhung der Kapital-
kosten führt, hat zwei gesamtwirtschaftlich sehr bedeutsame Implikationen. Zum 
einen könnten Veränderungen in den Kapitalkosten mit den zur Diskussion ste-
henden Entschädigungszahlungen für die Stilllegung der Atomkraftwerke ver-
rechnet werden, und zwar in beide Richtungen. Sinkende Kapitalkosten schmä-
lern die Opportunitätskosten des Ausstiegs für die Stromkonzerne, höhere stei-
gern sie. Zum anderen drücken die Veränderungen der Kapitalkosten auch die 
Erwartungen des Kapitalmarktes bezüglich des Erfolgs des Ausstiegs an. Ein 
stärkerer Anstieg des wahrgenommenen Risikos ist als Indikator für größere Be-
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sorgnis hinsichtlich eines schnellen, erfolgreichen Umstiegs auf erneuerbare 
Energien zu interpretieren. 
Die nachfolgend genutzte Methodik zur Ermittlung von Risikoveränderun-
gen basiert auf Aktienkursreaktionen im Nachgang zur Atomkatastrophe in Fu-
kushima. Ein entsprechendes Vorgehen muss sich der generellen Frage nach der 
Verlässlichkeit solcher Daten widmen, die zunächst einmal den großen Vorteil 
haben, sehr unmittelbar zur Verfügung zu stehen. Kapitalmärkte haben sich – 
entgegen der landläufigen Meinung – bei großen Katastrophen als durchaus sehr 
rational und effizient in der Informationsverarbeitung erwiesen (Kleidt et al., 
2009; Schiereck and Zeidler, 2009). Terroranschläge, Erdbeben und Wirbel-
stürme wurden ganz überwiegend sofort in einer Form in Aktienkurse einge-
rechnet, dass spätere Adjustierungen nicht notwendig waren. Deshalb ist auch 
im hier vorliegenden Fall davon auszugehen, dass die durch die Atomkatastro-
phe in Fukushima generierten veränderten Erfolgs- und Risikoeinschätzungen 
für Stromproduzenten in Deutschland unverzerrt in die Aktienbewertungen ein-
geflossen sind. Vor diesem Hintergrund richtet sich die nachfolgende Analyse 
auf zwei Aspekte: 
Welchen unmittelbaren spezifischen Wertverlust haben die Aktionäre als Ei-
genkapitalgeber von Stromkonzernen durch die Atomkatastrophe in Japan 
erfahren? 
Wie hat sich das vom Finanzmarkt wahrgenommene systematische Eigenka-
pitalrisiko für die Stromkonzerne verändert und welche Auswirkungen 
sind daraus auf zukünftige Finanzierungskosten abzuleiten? 
Zur Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird nachfolgend zunächst in Abschnitt 3.2 
kurz auf die heutige Bedeutung der Atomenergie für die deutschen Stromkon-
zerne eingegangen, bevor Abschnitt 3.3 Datensatz und Methodik der empiri-
schen Auswertung vorgestellt. Abschnitt 3.4 präsentiert die erzielten Ergebnisse 
und interpretiert sie danach auch. Zum Abschluss fasst Abschnitt 3.5 die zentra-
len Erkenntnisse zusammen und gibt einen Ausblick. 
3.2 Die Bedeutung der Kernenergie für deutsche 
Stromkonzerne 
Der deutsche Energiemarkt stellt mit 13,3 Exajoule (2009) den größten Primär-
energieverbraucher in Europa dar. Fast ein Viertel des Bruttostroms wird aus 
Kernenergie gewonnen, der auf Kernenergie basierende Anteil der Bruttostro-
  28 
28 
 
merzeugung betrug 2009 etwa 22,4%9 (138TWh). Trotz der schon intensiven 
Förderungen und des schnellen Ausbaus erneuerbarer Energien nimmt die Ener-
giegewinnung aus Kernenergie somit aktuell noch einen wichtigen Platz im 
deutschen Energiesystem ein, und ein Ausstieg erfordert den Ersatz dieses An-
teils am Energiemix durch alternative Produktion. 
Die beiden größten Energieproduzenten in Deutschland (E.ON und RWE) 
erzeugen Analystenschätzungen zufolge 30% bzw. 17% ihres operativen Erfolgs 
(EBITDA) mit der Produktion und dem Verkauf von Kernenergie. Dieser hohe 
Anteil erzeugt eine tiefgreifende Abhängigkeit der Energieversorger gegenüber 
den strukturellen Brüchen, die in direktem Zusammenhang mit der Kernenergie 
stehen (z.B. Ausstieg aus der Kernenergie, Ausstieg aus dem Ausstieg). Zusätz-
lich zu den seit Beginn der Stromgewinnung aus Kernenergie wahrgenommenen 
Risiken wurden durch die Erdbeben- und Flutkatastrophe in Japan weitere Risi-
kofelder deutlich. So sehen sich die Betreiber von Kernreaktoren noch nicht be-
zifferten Kosten durch die mögliche Auflage zusätzlicher Sicherheitseinrichtun-
gen und den Bau von Flutbarrieren gegenüber. Zudem gewinnt die Diskussion 
über den sicheren Betrieb der älteren Reaktoren erneute Brisanz, und eine dau-
erhafte Abschaltung dieser Reaktoren ist als nicht unwahrscheinlich anzusehen. 
Eben diese alten Einrichtungen jedoch tragen einen prozentual großen Anteil 
zum Gewinn der Energieversorger bei, da sie in den Bilanzen als größtenteils 
abgeschrieben gelten und somit keine Gewinn mindernden Wertanpassungen 
verursachen. 
3.3 Datenbasis und Untersuchungsmethodik 
Im folgenden Abschnitt wird zum einen auf die Zusammensetzung des Daten-
satzes und zum anderen auf die ökonometrischen Grundlagen der Modellierung 
für die weiteren empirischen Auswertungen eingegangen. Die Methodik erlaubt 
es, in aggregierten Form zu erfassen, wie insbesondere Akteure an den internati-
onalen Kapitalmärkten strukturelle Veränderungen nach der Atomkatastrophe in 
Japan beurteilen und in ihre Werturteile für den Aktienkurs und das systemati-
sche Eigenkapitalrisiko der Energieversorgungsunternehmen in Deutschland 
einordnen. 
                                                     
9  BMWi (2010), Energie in Deutschland. 
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3.3.1 Datensatz 
Die Untersuchung konzentriert sich auf börsennotierte Energieversorgungsun-
ternehmen, die auf dem deutschen Markt tätig sind. Den Markt für (Kern-) 
Energieversorgung teilen sich vier große Marktteilnehmer auf (RWE, E.ON, 
Vattenfall und EnBW). Die in Deutschland agierende, aber zum nicht börsenno-
tierten, schwedischen Mutterkonzern gehörende Vattenfall ist eine 100%ige 
Tochter des Mutterkonzerns und kann somit nicht für die Analyse verwendet 
werden. Allerdings empfiehlt es sich, neben Stromproduzenten mit dem Ge-
schäftsfeld Kernenergie auch ein Vergleichsunternehmen ohne diese Form der 
Energieerzeugung einzubeziehen, um eine nationale Vergleichsgröße nutzen zu 
können. Dazu wird die Mannheimer Versorgungs- und Verkehrsgesellschaft 
Energie AG (MVV) eingebracht, die in ihrem Energiemix keinen Atomstrom 
produziert (Tabelle 4). Durch diese vier Energieerzeuger ist zumindest ansatz-
weise auch der Bundesverband der Energie- und Wasserwirtschaft (BDEW) ab-
gebildet, in dem die gesamte deutsche Energiewirtschaft vertreten ist. In diesem 
Verband kam es Anfang April auf einer außerordentlichen Sitzung zu einem 
heftigen Streit zwischen den vier Atomkraftbetreibern und den kommunalen 
Versorgern. Unterschiede in den Kapitalmarktreaktionen für die MVV einerseits 
und vor allem den beiden großen im Streubesitz gehaltenen E.ON und RWE an-
dererseits liefern einen sehr rationalen betriebswirtschaftlichen Hintergrund für 
diesen Streit. Die EnBW wird hier der Vollständigkeit halber auch erfasst, ange-
sichts des öffentlichen Anteilsbesitzes von über 98% und nur sehr geringfügiger 
Börsenhandelsaktivität sind hier Kapitalmarktdaten aber weniger aussagekräftig. 
Die Kursreihen der Unternehmen sind dem Datenanbieter Datastream entnom-
men. 
Table 4: Energiemix der Versorgungsunternehmen 
 Streubesitz [%] Energiemix [%]     
  Kernenergie Gas Kohle EE Sonstige
EnBW 1,85 51,0 34,5* 10,5 4,0
E.ON ~ 85,00 26,0 35,0 28,0 9,0 2,0
MVV 18,50 - 6,6 68,9 11,2 13,3
RWE ~ 80,00 20,0 25,0 35,0 20,0 -
Daten aus Konzernberichten 2009/10 entnommen. 
* Angabe für alle konventionellen Energieträger. 
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3.3.2 Ereignisstudie 
Zur Messung der Auswirkungen der Atomkatastrophe auf die Börsenkurse 
(Fama et al., 1969) der Energieversorger wird eine Ereignisstudie (MacKinlay, 
1997) angewandt. Mit dieser Methodik wurden in der Vergangenheit immer 
wieder auch unerwartete Großschadensfälle wie Naturkatastrophen (Kleidt et al., 
2009.) oder Terroranschläge (Schiereck & Zeidler, 2009) auf die Aktienrenditen 
betroffener Unternehmen erfolgreich analysiert. Die Methodik gilt entsprechend 
als internationaler Standard einer kapitalmarktnahen Auswertung. 
Anhand einer Ereignisstudie werden Aktienrenditen eines Unternehmens 
mit den Renditen eines Aktiengesamtmarktes verglichen, wobei ein Aktienindex 
als Vertreter des Aktienmarktes das allgemeine Marktverhalten abbildet und 
somit als Referenzgröße dient. Es werden mögliche abnormale Aktienrenditen 
(AR – Abnormal Returns) ermittelt, die als Indikator für die Bewertung eines 
Ereignisses durch den Kapitalmarkt für die untersuchten Unternehmen zu inter-
pretieren sind. In Formel 3.1 wird die Ermittlung der Differenz zwischen der 
tatsächlich beobachteten Aktienrendite (Ri,t) des Unternehmens i am Tag t und 
der (ohne Eintreten des zu analysierenden Ereignisses) erwarteten Rendite 
(E(Ri,t)) am Tag t abgebildet: 
)( ,,, tititi RERAR        (3.1) 
Zur Schätzung der Referenzgröße (erwartete Rendite) wird das Marktmodell 
(Formel 3.2) verwendet (Binder, 1985). Die Koeffizienten αi und βi werden 
hierbei mittels einer linearen Regression (OLS) über Aktienindexrenditen ge-
schätzt, die für eine Schätzperiode im Vorfeld des Ereignisses von 200 Tagen 
herangezogen werden. Diese täglichen Marktrenditen werden hier durch die In-
dexrenditen des DAX widergespiegelt. Der Fehlerterm der Regressionsschät-
zung  ist durch ei,t repräsentiert: 
titmiiti eRRE ,,, *)(        (3.2) 
Um mögliche Einflüsse des zu beurteilenden Ereignisses auf die vorgelager-
te Schätzperiode bei der ex ante erwarteten Aktienrendite zu vermeiden, wird 
ein 30-Tage Fenster zwischen Schätzperiode und Ereignis eingeschoben. An-
schließend werden die abnormalen Renditen für jeden Tag im ausgewerteten 
Zeitfenster um das Ereignis ermittelt und aufaddiert. Die dabei errechneten ku-
mulierten abnormalen Renditen (CAR – Cumulative Abnormal Return) bilden 
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den Gesamteffekt eines Ereignissen für jedes einzelne Unternehmen über ver-
schiedene Zeitintervalle (Ereignisfenster: t1 bis t2): 
  2 1 ,t tt tii ARCAR       (3.3) 
Die CAR werden für alle erfassten Unternehmen gleich gewichtet addiert, 
und anhand des arithmetischen Mittels wird ein Mittelwert gebildet (CAAR – 
Cumulative Averaged Abnormal Returns): 
  Ni iCARNCAAR 11      (3.4) 
Die zu testende Nullhypothese entspricht einer kumulierten durchschnittli-
chen abnormalen Aktienrendite (CAAR) von Null. Diese Annahme entspricht 
dem Tatbestand, dass das Ereignis keinen Einfluss auf den Aktienkurs der Un-
ternehmen nimmt. Für den Test auf Signifikanz werden ein Standard t-Test und 
zwei weitere statistische Testverfahren angewandt. Zum einen berücksichtigt 
das Verfahren von Boehmer et al. (1991) einen häufig beobachteten ereignisin-
duzierten Anstieg der Varianz der Aktienrenditen innerhalb des Ereignisfensters. 
Dies ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass unerwartete Ereignisse zu überdurch-
schnittlichen Handelsaktivitäten führen, die wiederum in einer erhöhten 
Schwankung der Kursreihen resultieren können. Die Nullhypothese wird daher 
beim Standard t-Test zu häufig abgelehnt. Zum anderen wird anhand eines mo-
difizierten t-Tests (Johnson, 1978) eine mögliche schiefe in der Verteilung der 
AR berücksichtigt, die ebenfalls dazu führt, die Annahme unabhängiger und 
normalverteilter AR nicht zu erfüllen. 
3.3.3 Risikomodellierung 
Das Renditerisiko, das einem Unternehmen beigemessen wird und das die Basis 
für die Renditeforderungen der Aktionäre bildet, kann anhand der Volatilität der 
erwirtschafteten Renditen gemessen werden.10 Grundsätzlich unterteilt man da-
bei das Risiko in zwei Teilbereiche, das systematische und das unsystematische 
Risiko. Das unsystematische Risiko beinhaltet einzelwirtschaftliche Risiken, die 
im jeweiligen Unternehmen selbst veranlagt sind. Dagegen ruht das systemati-
                                                     
10  Dieser Ansatz stammt aus der Modernen Portfoliotheorie und geht auf Markowitz 
(1952) zurück. 
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sche Risiko auf marktinhärenten Veränderungen. Das systematische Risiko kann 
daher nicht wie das unsystematische durch Diversifikation (effiziente Portfolio-
zusammensetzung) von Kapitalanlegern vermieden werden. Es wird über den 
Betafaktor erfasst und beziffert den Teil des gesamten Anlagerisikos, für dessen 
Übernahme ein Investor eine Kompensation verlangt, da er dieses Risiko nicht 
eliminieren kann. 
Die Kosten für das durch die Katastrophe von Fukushima ausgelöste verän-
derte Risiko lassen sich in vereinfachter Weise auf den Fremdkapital- und den 
Eigenkapitalanteil des Unternehmens aufteilen. Fremdkapitalkosten werden da-
bei von Fremdkapitalgebern und Ratingagenturen im Rahmen von entsprechen-
den Bewertungsverfahren ermittelt und sind im Allgemeinen leicht zugänglich. 
Die Kosten für den Eigenkapitalanteil und damit die Bestimmung der Kosten für 
das systematische Eigenkapitalrisiko lassen sich nur anhand von Kapitalmarkt-
daten ermitteln. Als Basis dient ein kapitalmarkttheoretisches Gleichgewichts-
modell, das von Sharpe (1964) vorgestellte Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM). Der in Formel 3.5 abgebildete Zusammenhang zeigt die Komponenten 
der unter Einbeziehung des systematischen Risikos einer Aktienanlage ermittel-
ten Eigenkapitalkosten: 
)(* fmifi RRRR        (3.5) 
Dabei bezeichnet Rf den risikolosen Zinssatz, Rm die Rendite des Marktport-
folios und βi die spezifische, systematische Risikomenge des Unternehmens. Der 
Betafaktor bezieht sich dabei nicht auf den Teil des Risikos, der durch Diversi-
fikation zu Null verringert werden kann (unsystematisches Risiko), sondern nur 
auf das systematische Risiko des Unternehmens. Er beschreibt dabei, inwieweit 
sich das Eigenkapitalrisiko unternehmensindividuell verändert, auch wenn keine 
Änderung der Marktrendite oder des risikofreien Anlagezinses eintritt. Formal 
ergeben der Quotient aus der Kovarianz (kov()) der Rendite der Anlage mit der 
Rendite des Marktportfolios und der Varianz (var()) der Marktrendite den Beta-
faktor: 
)var(
),(
m
mi
i R
RRkov       (3.6) 
Im Rahmen dieser Analyse wird eine Verschiebung des Betafaktors als eine 
Änderung des systematischen Eigenkapitalrisikos interpretiert. Dieser Ansatz 
findet in der Literatur weit verbreitete Anwendung (Riddick, 1992; Havenner et 
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al., 2001; Paleari and Redondi, 2005). Die Differenz aus Aktienmarktrendite und 
risikofreiem Zins wird Marktrisikoprämie genannt. 
3.4 Ergebnisse 
Die Vorstellung der Ergebnisse zur Beantwortung unserer beiden Forschungs-
leitfragen erfolgt in zwei Schritten. Zunächst wird analysiert, ob  signifikante 
Kursreaktionen bei den Energieversorgungsunternehmen stattgefunden haben. 
Darauf folgend werden die sich ändernden Risikoeinschätzungen für die vier 
Unternehmen aus Sicht des Kapitalmarktes über Veränderungen in den Betafak-
toren ermittelt. 
3.4.1 Ergebnisse Ereignisstudie 
Die kumulierten durchschnittlichen Aktienkursreaktionen aller vier Energiever-
sorgungsunternehmen sind in Table 5 dargestellt. Am Tag der Atomkatastrophe 
(11.03.2011) sind insignifikant positive abnormale Renditen (1,15%) zu beo-
bachten. Die verheerenden Konsequenzen, die der Tsunami für die Atomreakto-
ren an der japanischen Nordostküste nach sich zieht, wurden erst nach Börsen-
schluss (MEZ) in ihrer Tragweite offensichtlich. An den beiden folgenden Han-
delstagen stellen sich signifikant negative (-2,31% und -3,68%) Aktienrenditen 
ein, die trotz der kleinen Stichprobe hohe statistische Signifikanzniveaus errei-
chen. Die Ereignisse in Fukushima haben somit zu einem sehr großen Verlust an 
Aktionärsvermögen bei den Anteilseignern der deutschen Stromerzeuger ge-
führt. Allein für E.ON bedeutet eine negative abnormale Rendite von 3% eine 
Minderung der Börsenkapitalisierung von mehr als einer Milliarde Euro. 
Table 5: Kumulierte Aktienkursrenditen der vier deutschen Energieversorger 
  Cumulative Abnormal Return t-Test Boehmer Test Johnson Test   
Event window Mean Median t-value z-score J-value Nobs 
[-3;-1] 0.82% 0.96% 1.540 1.606 1.514 4 
[±0; ±0] 1.15% 1.49% 2.669*** 2.546* 1.747 4 
[±0;+1] -2.31% -2.69% -3.098*** -3.357** -2.364* 4 
[±0;+2] -3.68% -4.44% -3.116*** -3.354** -2.326 4 
[±0;+5] -1.78% -2.25% -1.154 -1.114 -1.069 4 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
  34 
34 
 
Da nur drei der vier untersuchten Energieversorger (EnBW, E.ON, RWE) 
Strom aus Kernenergie produzieren und verkaufen, ist zu erwarten, dass die Ka-
pitalmarktreaktionen auf die Atomkatastrophe für die jeweiligen Energieanbieter 
unterschiedlich ausfallen. In Tabelle 6 sind die Werte nur für die kumulierten 
durchschnittlichen Aktienrenditen der Atomstrom anbietenden Versorger aufge-
listet. Der Kursrückgang fällt in den ersten beiden Tagen noch stärker aus als bei 
der Untersuchung aller Unternehmen. Zudem bleibt nun festzustellen, dass auch 
im zeitlich längsten Ereignisfenster der Rückgang von -3,05% auf statistisch be-
lastbarem Niveau bleibt. Dieser Effekt wird verständlich, wenn man berücksich-
tigt, dass der einzige nicht Atomstrom anbietende Versorger MVV bereits ab 
dem dritten Tag nach der Katastrophe einen positiven Kursverlauf verzeichnet. 
Table 6: Kumulierte Aktienrenditen der drei Atomstromanbieter (EnBW, E.ON, RWE) 
  Cumulative Abnormal Re-turn t-Test Boehmer Test Johnson Test   
Event window Mean Median t-value z-score J-value Nobs 
[-3;-1] 0.50% 0.40% 0.836 0.888 0.930 3 
[±0; ±0] 0.94% 1.37% 1.750* 1.665 1.305 3 
[±0;+1] -2.31% -3.08% -2.247** -2.377 -1.696 3 
[±0;+2] -3.70% -5.24% -2.269** -2.384 -1.655 3 
[±0;+5] -3.05% -4.23% -2.117** -2.181 -1.582 3 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
3.4.2 Ergebnisse zur Veränderung der Betafaktoren 
Die Veränderung des systematischen Aktienrisikos und damit der Eigenkapital-
kosten kann anhand einer Verschiebung des Betafaktors eines Unternehmens 
veranschaulicht werden. Figure 2 zeigt die Betafaktoren der vier Versorger, die 
rollierend für einen 100-Tage-Zeitraum berechnet werden. 
Der Verlauf der Koeffizienten von RWE und E.ON folgt leicht versetzt dem 
gleichen Schema und bewegt sich für das Jahr 2010 zwischen 0,6 und 0,8. Beide 
Energieanbieter zeigen ab dem Handelstag nach der Atomkatastrophe einen 
deutlichen Anstieg der Betafaktoren. Ihr systematisches Risiko steigt deutlich 
an. Der Koeffizient für RWE steigt um ein Viertel seines vorherigen Wertes auf 
0,7 und verläuft auch in den Folgetagen tendenziell steigend. Für den Versorger 
E.ON ist ein etwas schwächerer Sprung auf einen Wert etwas unter 0,7 zu ver-
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zeichnen. Auch hier gilt es sich zu verdeutlichen, welcher Gesamteffekt beo-
bachtet wird. Bei typischen Marktrisikoprämien, die in jüngsten Umfragen bei 
aktuell über 5% liegen, induziert der beobachtete Anstieg von Beta um mehr als 
0,2 einen Anstieg der Eigenkapitalkosten um mehr als einen Prozentpunkt. Ein 
Stromkonzern mit einer Marktbewertung von 50 Mrd. Euro hat damit eine Ver-
teuerung seines Eigenkapitals um 500 Mio. Euro zu verzeichnen. 
Bei EnBW ist keine merkliche Verschiebung des Beta Koeffizienten festzu-
stellen, was angesichts der bereits erwähnten kaum vorhandenen Handelsaktivi-
tät in der Aktie nicht verwundert. Analysteneinschätzungen zur Folge weist 
EnBW für in 2010 ein Beta von 0,4911 auf. 
 
 
Figure 2: Zeitlich veränderliche Beta-Koeffizienten der vier Energieversorger 
                                                     
11  Informationen des Datenanbieters Thomson Reuters. 
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Für den Energieanbieter MVV, der keinen Atomstrom produziert, ist im 
Gegensatz zu RWE und E.ON tendenziell eine Verringerung von Beta zu beo-
bachten. Figure 2 illustriert dies und zeigt ein Absinken des Eigenkapitalrisikos 
in der Folge der Ereignisse des 11. März um ein Drittel auf etwa 0,2. Tenden-
ziell ist ein weiteres Absinken des Wertes zu erkennen. 
Zusammenfassend lässt sich eine deutliche Erhöhung des durch den Markt 
bewerteten Eigenkapitalrisikos der Atomstrom anbietenden Energieversorger 
RWE und E.ON feststellen. Der Energieanbieter MVV, der keinen Atomstrom 
in seinem Energiemix einschließt, zeigt eine merkliche Verringerung des Eigen-
kapitalrisikos und damit verbunden auch niedrigere Eigenkapitalkosten. 
3.5 Zusammenfassung und Ausblick 
Die Auswertungen der Kapitalmarktreaktionen nach der Atomkatastrophe von 
Fukushima zeigen, dass die Betreiber von Kernkraftwerken in Deutschland ei-
nen deutlichen Verlust an Aktionärsvermögen und eine sichtbare Erhöhung ihrer 
Eigenkapitalkosten hinnehmen mussten. Beide Effekte belasten die finanzielle 
Leistungsfähigkeit dieser Stromkonzerne und beschränken ihre Fähigkeiten, ei-
nen signifikanten Investitionsbeitrag zur Energiewende zu leisten. Es empfiehlt 
sich deshalb, für die Suche nach möglichen Investoren andere Unternehmen zu 
adressieren. Dies könnte auch zu einer Anbieterstruktur im deutschen Energie-
markt führen, die weniger von den heute dominanten vier großen Konzernen 
geprägt ist. 
 
 
 
37 
 
4. Sustainable Project Finance, the Adoption of 
the Equator Principles, and Shareholder 
Value Effects 
 
 
Abstract 
Recent trends in the project finance industry include increasing volume and a 
growing awareness of sustainable development. This has raised the question of 
whether and a how voluntary code of conduct such as the Equator Principles 
(EP) could enhance their impact on the project finance industry. We apply an 
event study methodology, and also consider the market model and conditional 
variance. We find positive abnormal returns for financial institutions adopting 
the EP, which supports the reputational risk hypothesis. Furthermore, we docu-
ment that adopters outperform the global project finance market, especially in 
terms of market share. However, we do not find evidence that non-adopters are 
excluded from lending syndicates. Results include practical recommendations 
for environmental policy. 
 
Eisenbach S, Schiereck D, Trillig J, Flotow P v. 2012. Sustainable Project Fi-
nance, the Adoption of the Equator Principles, and Shareholder Value Ef-
fects. Business Strategy and the Environment (forthcoming). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The importance of project finance as a method of funding large infrastructure 
and industrial assets has grown dramatically in recent years. Infrastructure pro-
jects, traditionally bankrolled by public bodies or strictly regulated monopolies, 
have become increasingly important to private sector firms. This trend is ex-
pected to continue growing (Esty and Sesia, 2010). According to the Dealogic 
Projectware Database, global project volume more than tripled from 2003 to 
2011, from U.S. $113.4 billion to U.S. $408.3 billion, with Asia being the fastest 
growing regional market. And project finance has become almost equally wide-
spread in less developed countries as a facilitator of economic growth 
(Kleimeier and Versteeg, 2010). 
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Project-financed assets are characterized by high initial investments of up to 
several billion dollars, and long but limited project lives. The financing, which 
usually includes a large share of bank debt, is based solely on predictable and 
ideally stable cash flows from operations. And, because risk is such an important 
factor in calculating cash flows, risk management plays a critical role in the 
structuring of projects (Case, 1999; Esty, 2004). Typical project finance risks are 
related to construction and operation of facilities, technological reliability, 
commodity and financial market conditions, the host country’s legal framework, 
and any force majeure events. 
Esty and Sesia (2010) note that a further class of risks stems from environ-
mental and social issues, considered one of the major trends in project finance. 
Large-scale developments, such as roads, airports, power plants, oil and gas 
pipelines, metal processing plants, and dams, can have significantly adverse im-
pacts on the environment and on local communities, particularly when undertak-
en in remote, ecologically sensitive areas. 
Concern over environmental and social topics, however, is not a new phe-
nomenon. Gassner (2012) describes the historical relationship between envi-
ronmental interests and rising costs to companies. Public awareness of these is-
sues grew dramatically during the 1960s, driven largely by high-profile cases 
such as the construction of the Central European Pipeline from Northern Italy to 
Southern Germany. A more recent case is described by Ray (2008). In 2005 
Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB) was put under public pressure to withdraw as 
financial advisor from the Sakhalin Project. The $ 12 billion gas and oil project 
planned by Shell was associated with numerous environmental and social viola-
tions. Finally, CSFB decided to withdraw from the project. Recently, Canadian 
banks have come under fire by environmentalists for providing loans to oil and 
gas companies. These companies use the capital to extract oil from the sands in 
Alberta, an area some have deemed ecologically sensitive. However, given that 
Canadian banks typically possess a high exposure to environmental issues, We-
ber (2012) considers these banks “Best in Class” in handling environmental and 
social issues. 
The increasing project finance volume, combined with the growing aware-
ness of environmental and social issues, raises the question of whether a more 
serious consideration of those issues within the business model, firstly, enhances 
the firm value and secondly, improves company’s performance. One way com-
panies could take this into account is to adopt (voluntary) codes of conducts. In 
2003 several commercial banks and the International Finance Cooperation (IFC) 
developed a voluntary code of conduct setting environmental and social perfor-
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mance standards in the project finance industry. Our research question, there-
fore, investigates whether adopting guidelines such as the Equator Principles 
(EP) can boost financial institutions (FIs) and the overall project finance indus-
try. A large body of literature has analyzed this impact (Heal, 2005; Wright and 
Rwabizambuga, 2006; Scholtens and Dam, 2007; Macve and Chen, 2010; 
Conley and Williams, 2011; Wright, 2012). We contribute and extend this exist-
ing strand of literature in the following ways. First, we study whether the impact 
of the EP has empirically changed over time, i.e., whether the capital markets 
react differently to financial institutions that were early adopters of EP than to 
later adopters. To the best of our knowledge no study exists that analyses empir-
ically this, recent time period and thus, no evidence exists of a potential devel-
opment of the EP. Second, we analyze the performance of Equator Principles 
Financial Institutions (EPFIs) in the project finance industry. The aim is to as-
sess whether adopters outperform the global project finance market and if per-
formance parameters such as project volume, number of projects or market share 
develop differently between adopters and non-adopters. No study is known to 
the authors that analyzes differences in performance of adopting and non-
adopting FIs. Third, we identify trends in EP projects. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents an 
introduction to the Equator Principles, and gives an overview of the theoretical 
background. Section 4.3 explains the applied methodology and describes our 
dataset. Section 4.4 gives our results, and section 4.5 provides a brief conclu-
sion. 
4.2 Theoretical Background 
In order to address environmental and social risks in project finance, a voluntary 
code of conduct for the banking industry was launched in June 2003. Nine 
commercial banks supported by the IFC drafted the so called Equator Principles. 
These principles directly refer to policies and guidelines of the World Bank and 
provide a common general framework according to which each adopting institu-
tion develops internal policies, procedures and standards. The principles are in-
tended to guide project financiers on how to address negative environmental and 
social impacts of their projects.12 The EP were substantially revised in 2006 (EP 
II) and the update process for the EP III was launched mid 2011. Today, over 
                                                     
12  For more details about the intention of the EP e.g. Wright and Rwabizambuga (2006), 
Conley and Williams (2011), Esty et al. (2007). 
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seventy institutions have adopted the EP which are now generally considered the 
market standard (see the Appendix for a complete list). 
Various types of research have been conducted in recent years on the impact 
of the Equator Principles. The predominant feature is the interview-based study, 
which analyzes EP performance from a qualitative perspective (e.g. Esty et al., 
2007; O'Sullivan and O'Dwyer, 2008; Macve and Chen, 2010; Conley and 
Williams, 2011; Wright, 2012). The results mainly relate to a successful imple-
mentation of a voluntary code of conduct pertaining to social and environmental 
risk, but remain critical of real environmental benefits and a perceived lack of 
accountability. A second important strand focuses on how financial institutions 
relate to sustainable development (Missbach, 2004; Heal, 2005; Richardson, 
2005; Coulson, 2009; Carnevale et al., 2012), and how environmental issues are 
incorporated into credit risk management (Weber et al., 2008; Bauer and Han, 
2010; Weber et al., 2010; Weber, 2012). The majority of studies reveal that FIs 
are becoming aware that they are vulnerable through environmentally and so-
cially inadequate behavior of their clients. Further, they are subject to increasing 
public pressure to exert influence on the clients’ appropriate behavior. Weber et 
al. (2010) and Weber (2012) provide results indicating that FIs increasingly in-
corporate environmental issues into their credit risk management. 
Another strand of research links environmental governance with the compa-
ny’s economic performance. Adopting the EP could be interpreted as incorporat-
ing environmental governance into the business model of FIs and thereby fol-
lowing binding performance standards in the project finance industry. Tang et 
al. (2012) find that a green reputation is one of the key mediators for transform-
ing environmental governance into economic performance gains. Furthermore, 
Rodriguez-Melo and Mansouri (2011) identify stakeholder engagement as the 
important issue in sustainable development and implicate „that to gain competi-
tive advantage companies should embark on long-term strategic alliances which 
adopt the proposals of environmental non-governmental organizations and 
closely follow public opinion.“ 
In one of the few primarily quantitative studies, Scholtens and Dam (2007) 
use an empirical analysis and find that financial institutions adopting the EP dif-
fer significantly from non-adopters along social, ethical, and environmental 
lines. Nevertheless, Scholtens and Dam (2007) also find that shareholders do not 
react to disclosures that financial institutions have adopted the EP. And, to the 
best of our knowledge, no empirical analysis exists for the 2007-2012 period. 
We would expect to find different capital market reactions for this period, due 
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not only to increasing environmental awareness, but also to fundamental revi-
sions of the EP that were undertaken in 2006. 
The moderate impact of the EP that most studies have found is attributable 
to the EP’s limited scope, as well as the lack of implementation standards, ac-
countability, and transparency (Esty et al., 2007; BankTrack, 2010). Since then 
the EP have been revised twice; a potentially intensified cooperation between 
FIs and NGOs as well as an increased importance of social and environmental 
issues in credit risk management are noticeable. The substantial 2006 revision 
was meant to address some of the early critiques, as well as to account for up-
dated IFC (International Finance Corporation) policies. The revision also broad-
ened its scope, and made the EP more applicable to smaller projects and project 
expansions, as well as to project finance advisory activities. Other major chang-
es included increased inclusion of social risks, the creation of a grievance mech-
anism, an increased number of covenants in the loan documentation, and the in-
troduction of a requirement for EPFIs to report on their implementation of the 
EP (Principle 10). 
However, the EP experienced renewed criticism in 2010, which generally 
faulted the lack of progress in advancing the EP (BankTrack, 2010). The EP As-
sociation Steering Committee approved the newly published IFC Performance 
Standards at the end of 2011, and announced the launch of EP III for year-end 
2012. Because the EP are based on IFC Performance Standards, it is essential 
that they capture any changes within these standards. The changes in the IFC 
Performance Standards relate mainly to increased information access (expanding 
the scope of information, increasing transparency regarding financial intermedi-
ary investments and advisory services) and a stronger requirement for FIs “to 
develop and implement Environment and Social Management Systems commen-
surate with their E&S risks” (IFC, 2012). The 2006 revisions and the ongoing 
debate over the second round of revisions coming at year-end 2012 have aided 
somewhat in overcoming the major criticisms, and have strengthened the EP’s 
influence. But the impact of the enhanced EP has not, to the best of our 
knowledge, been empirically analyzed yet. 
The continuous updating process promotes awareness of setting perfor-
mance standards among all market participants. One of the EP’s key values is 
the standardization and institutionalization of procedures to address social and 
environmental issues, with the goal of increasing consistency within EPFI pro-
ject finance operations. And, through using the EP, bankers are more likely to 
have the same vocabulary and similar expectations for project sustainability per-
formance (Scholtens and Dam, 2007; Wright, 2012). Beyond financial institu-
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tions, the same argument can be considered valid for all other market partici-
pants, which emphasizes the reach of the EP. The establishment of the EP has 
led to increased involvement with NGOs, and simplified communications with 
project sponsors (Conley and Williams, 2011). Nowadays, the latter tend to be 
more aware of social and environmental challenges, so they approach banks 
with more advanced project proposals. They also realize that projects must be 
EP-compliant to obtain sufficient funding. 
The EP have also intensified cooperation between adopting institutions, thus 
many of the bankers involved have become acquainted and begun to communi-
cate on a regular basis. An established working relationship tends to simplify the 
allocation and coordination of the project finance process. Recent interview-
based studies (e.g. Conley and Williams, 2011) suggest that this trend has in-
creased significantly over the last several years, thus further highlighting the im-
portance of having an objective and updated analysis of the impact of the EP. 
Within the realm of project finance, controlling for risk is key to success. 
Financial institutions have naturally broadened their risk perspective beyond the 
typical project finance risks (e.g., operational, legal) to include environmental 
and social risks (Esty and Sesia, 2010). In fact, social and environmental issues 
are increasingly influencing both credit and reputational risk. 
Weber et al. (2010) argue that considering sustainability criteria in credit 
risk management can improve the predictability of risk and risk management, 
thus confirming the findings of Coulson (2009) and Wagner (2009). Goss and 
Roberts (2011) find that banks lending to borrowers with environmental or so-
cial concerns require these firms to pay a higher loan spread than they otherwise 
would. Although the spread is small and thus the impact incidental, Goss and 
Roberts (2011) conclude that banks obviously consider corporate social respon-
sibility concerns to be somewhat risky. Weber (2012) conducts an interview-
based analysis for Canadian financial institutions, and suggests that, at least with 
respect to credit risk management, environmental risks are managed to avoid 
financial risk. 
Business strategies that simultaneously increase efficiency and reduce envi-
ronmental impact are referred to as “eco-efficient” strategies. Sinkin et al. 
(2008) (for U.S. companies) and Al-Najjar (2012) (for U.K. companies) show 
higher market values for companies that have adopted eco-efficient strategies. 
They posit that fewer input factors, as well as benefits from government regula-
tion, competition, and better access to capital, are the reasons for the higher 
market values. Recent research on the advantages of considering social and en-
  43 
 
 
vironmental issues in credit risk management and the value-generating effect of 
adopting eco-efficient strategies seems to predict increased interest in the EP. 
We thus expect to see positive share price reactions after the announcement 
of a project finance firm’s adoption of the EP. During volatile times, an empiri-
cal analysis of these effects would need to control for conditional variance in 
financial time series, where there is no general assumption of constant variance. 
The effects of volatility clustering have been explored in several studies (e.g. 
French et al., 1987). Thus, a time-dependent change in variance (heteroscedasti-
city) of financial returns is very likely, particularly during upward- or down-
ward-trending economic periods. 
However, since the implementation of the EP, the 2008 worldwide financial 
crisis has given reason to assume there is conditional variance in the stock re-
turns of financial institutions. Our research relates to this issue because we en-
hance the existing strand of literature by using an empirical model that accounts 
for asset return heteroscedasticity to estimate the impact of the EP. 
In summary, the basis for the motivation of our analysis and its contribu-
tions to the literature come from 1) the lack of empirical studies that analyze the 
2007-2012 period, 2) the improvements in the EP made by the 2006 revisions 
and the ongoing debate over potential 2012 revisions, 3) the potentially intensi-
fied cooperation between FIs and NGOs, 4) the increased importance of social 
and environmental issues in credit risk management, and 5) the assumption of 
heteroscedasticity in FI asset returns. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Event Study 
We use the event study approach suggested by MacKinlay (1997) to quantify the 
potential effects of EP adoption announcements. This method is commonly used 
to measure the effect on company value of corporate events such as mergers and 
acquisitions, equity issues, earnings announcements, and management changes. 
But it is also commonly used to analyze the results of the adoption of voluntary 
codes (such as the EP) (Nowak et al., 2006; Scholtens and Dam, 2007), partner-
ships with, e.g., the USEPA Climate Leaders program (Keele and DeHart, 
2011), the publication of “green” company rankings (Amato and Amato, 2012), 
or “environmental investments” (Halme and Niskanen, 2001). In the context of 
this analysis, we interpret stock price reactions to EP adoptions as the capital 
market’s evaluation of a company’s commitment to conduct its project finance 
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business under EP guidelines. We can also interpret abnormal announcement 
returns as a reflection of all the expected future benefits and costs, and thus the 
changes in expected future cash flows that would result from this corporate deci-
sion. 
We use traditional event study methodology. We follow the specifications of 
Savickas (2003) and Aktas et al. (2007), and consider the conditionally 
heteroscedastic behavior of volatility during the estimation period. While these 
authors suggest controlling for GARCH effects in the test statistics, we instead 
consider such effects in estimating the regression coefficients (αi and βi in Equa-
tion (4.1)). We expect financial institutions’ stock returns to be affected by, e.g., 
the early 2000 crisis or the 2008 financial crisis, but Corhay and Tourani Rad 
(1996) argue that “Even though there is no intrinsic interest in estimating the 
conditional variance, the market model should be estimated by maximum likeli-
hood in order to obtain a more efficient estimator of the regression parameters.” 
The abnormal return is the difference between the actual return and the 
benchmark return. We estimate the benchmark returns by using Brown and 
Warner’s (1985) market model: 
titmiiti eRRE ,,, *)(        (4.1) 
Here, E(Ri,t) is the expected stock return of EPFI i, and Rm,t is the return of 
the market index on day t. By estimating Equation 4.1, we assume the error term 
follows a GARCH (1,1) process, and the variance of the error term is condition-
al on the specific information set It-1: 
),0(~| 21, ttti NIe   .      (4.2) 
The information set contains all the past returns up to and including t-1. The 
conditional variance, denoted as σt², is conditional on the information set, which 
we assume is not random because it is observable. Furthermore, the error term is 
normally distributed with 0 mean and a variance of: 
2
1
2
1
2 **   ttt e   .     (4.3) 
We estimate the parameters by using maximum likelihood estimation, with 
an estimation period from 180 to 21 days prior to the event. In Equation 4.1, the 
MSCI World Financials Index is used to represent the market. 
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We can define the abnormal return for every day t as follows: 
)( ,,, tititi RERAR        (4.4) 
where Ri,t represents the actual daily return. The abnormal return is then 
combined over different event windows. Letting t1 and t2 denote the beginning 
and the ending day of a time window under observation, the cumulative abnor-
mal return of security i is thus: 
  2 1 ,t tt tii ARCAR       (4.5) 
In order to assess the statistical significance of the results, we use a standard 
two-tailed t-test, a modified t-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and a 
modified t-test as proposed by Johnson (1978). All have the joint null hypothesis 
that the mean and median cumulative abnormal returns in every observed period 
[t1, t2] equal 0. 
4.3.2 MLA League Table Analysis 
Beyond the analysis of capital market reactions, a further means to assess the 
success of EPFIs is the examination of League Tables over time. League Tables 
rank players in the project finance arena according to project volume, number of 
projects, or market share. For this analysis, we obtain mandated lead arranger 
(MLA) League Tables (for the Top 200) for the 2000-2011 period from 
Dealogic Projectware. EPFIs acting in the role of an MLA can exert the most 
influence on project design, and thus play a critical role in implementing the EP, 
even though the scope of the EP has been extended to include project finance 
advisory activities. We consider two sets of League Tables here, one that in-
cludes all global projects, and one that includes all developing country projects. 
In the first step, we determine the ranking of each EPFI with regard to pro-
ject volume for both the year of EP adoption as well as the three years prior to 
and after adoption, respectively. We exclude any EPFIs that were not in the top 
100 or higher in any of these seven years, as we assume these institutions do not 
have significant project finance operations. 
Next, for each EPFI, we compare project volume, number of projects, and 
market share prior to and after EP adoption. We conduct short-term (ST) and 
long-term (LT) analyses. For the short-term analysis, we compare the years pre-
ceding and subsequent to the adoption year. For the long-term analysis, we 
compare the averages of the respective values for the three years preceding and 
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subsequent to the adoption year. The latter analysis is possible for institutions 
that adopted the EP in 2008 or earlier. We calculate absolute values as well as 
relative changes compared to the market in order to control for strong and weak 
project finance market periods. 
We find that the most meaningful results are the relative increases in the re-
spective parameters from before EP adoption to afterward. To put the relative 
increases into perspective, however, we must compare them to overall market 
development. The reference value in the short-term analysis is the three-year 
growth rate (3YGR), which can be calculated from the compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR). 
By averaging over the three-year period prior to and after adoption, the 
long-term analysis can essentially be seen as comparing the respective values 
three years before adoption with the values three years afterward. The corre-
sponding seven-year growth rate (7YGR) is thus calculated analogously. 
4.3.3 Sample 
Our initial sample comprised eighty-five financial institutions, which we col-
lected from the official homepage from the EP (equator-principles.com). Seven-
ty-seven13 of these companies currently use the EP. The remaining eight compa-
nies had also adopted the EP, but not in their current incarnation. For example, 
Itaú Unibanco S.A. was created in 2008 by a merger of Unibanco, which an-
nounced EP adoption on 6 January 2004, and Banco Itaú, which announced 
adoption on 8 December 2004. Note that the company with the most recent an-
nouncement is Banco Mercantil del Norte S.A., which announced EP adoption 
on 12 March 2012. 
Our sample covers approximately nine years, which allows us to control for 
potential changes in effects after the July 2006 revision. Public data come from 
Datastream, and we excluded any companies for which public data was not 
available. This further shrank our sample to forty-six companies. Two compa-
nies were excluded due to stock illiquidity, i.e. they showed a constant share 
price for the entire estimation and event period. This left a final sample of forty-
                                                     
13 As of June 2012, the seventy-seven adopting financial institutions were comprised of 
seventy-five EPFIs and two associates. According to the official definition from the EP 
website, “An Associate is a financial institution that is not active in project finance and 
adopts the Equator Principles (EP) as part of its broader approach to sustainability.” 
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four financial institutions. Table 7 presents descriptive statistics for the sample 
companies. 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics of Sample Companies 
 All Adopters Early Adopters Late Adopters OECD Other 
 Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
MC ($mil) 35064.4 40668.3 39537.6 45889.5 29348.7 33236.6 44227.5 42885.6 6658.8 5866.6
TA ($bil) 6137.49 25250.93 10425.27 33395.41 658.67 575.54 8008.12 28901.16 338.52 380.58
E/A 4.98 2.40 4.62 2.38 5.44 2.42 4.44 2.17 6.66 2.41 
ROAE 2.73 3.08 2.31 3.49 3.23 2.48 2.56 3.28 3.21 2.45 
# 41  23  18  31  10  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the sample companies. MC denotes market capitalization; TA de-
notes total assets; E/A denotes equity to assets and ROAE denotes return on average equity. 
 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Short-Term Stock Market Reactions 
Table 8: EP Adopter CARs 
This table reports the means and medians of financial institutions’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around 
EP adoption. We test the CARs for statistical significance using a standard two-tailed t-test, a modified t-test as 
proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and a modified t-test as proposed by Johnson (1978). We test for statistical 
significance of the median CAR by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Nobs denotes the number of financial 
institutions in the event study. 
 
Cumulative Abnormal 
Return t-Test 
Boehmer et 
al. (1991) 
Test 
Johnson 
(1978) Test 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-
Rank Test  
Event Window Mean Median t-value z-score j-value z-score Nobs 
[-10;+10] -0.20% 0.24% -0.136 0.060 -0.138 -0.070 44 
[-5;+5] 0.42% 0.24% 0.541 0.900 0.534 -0.782 44 
[-3;+3] 0.35% 0.00% 0.563 0.538 0.572 -0.070 44 
[0;0] -0.01% 0.17% -0.047 0.080 -0.047 -0.058 44 
[0;+2] -0.06% -0.06% -0.122 -0.391 -0.122 -0.257 44 
[0;+3] 0.80% 0.44% 1.798* 1.643 1.813* -1.447 44 
[0;+5] 0.58% 0.17% 0.975 0.887 0.983 -0.607 44 
[+1;+5] 0.59% 0.15% 0.849 0.778 0.856 -0.922 44 
[-5;-1] -0.16% -0.01% -0.254 0.247 -0.260 -0.012 44 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 gives our findings for stock price reactions upon EP announcements. 
We show CARs for the day of the announcement, as well as for several event 
windows of up to ten days before and ten days after the announcement. To con-
trol anticipatory effects and reactions after the announcement we show the event 
windows [-5;-1] and [+1;+5], respectively. 
The results exhibit slightly negative but insignificant CARs for the event 
day and the event window including the two following days. Nevertheless, we 
examine positive and partially statistically significant CARs for the [0;+3], 
[0;+5], and [+1;+5] windows. We find that the lag time between the announce-
ment and the reaction is within the normal range. However, there are two plau-
sible explanations for any delays: 1) the announcement of the adoption of a vol-
untary code of conduct is not considered as important as, e.g., the announcement 
of a merger or an acquisition; thus the market takes time to process the infor-
mation, and 2) stakeholders and the operational areas of financial institutions 
tend to be spread out globally. Time differences could cause lags in market reac-
tions. 
Table 9 compares CARs for FIs that adopted the EP before the 2006 revi-
sion with those that adopted afterward. We find positive and significant CARs 
for the early adopters, who induced market reactions leading to a 1.26% average 
rise in equity on the event day and for the following three days [0;+3]. We find 
no significant results, however, for the late adopters, but we observe a two-day 
lag to the announcement in this subsample. Thus, contrary to other studies, such 
as, e.g., (Scholtens and Dam, 2007) we find positive CARs for this group of 
adopters. 
  49 
 
 
Table 9: Early/Late EP Adopter CARs 
This table reports the means and medians of subsamples of financial institutions’ cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around EP adoption. We test the CARs for statistical significance using a standard two-tailed t-test, a 
modified t-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and a modified t-test as proposed by Johnson (1978). We 
test for statistical significance of the median CAR by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Nobs denotes the 
number of financial institutions in the event study. 
  Cumulative Abnormal Return t-Test 
Boehmer et 
al. (1991) 
Test 
Johnson 
(1978) Test 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-
Rank Test  
Event Window Mean Median t-value z-score j-value z-score Nobs 
     Panel A: Early Adopters  
[-10;+10] -0.85% 0.45% -0.485 0.019 -0.511 -0.067 25 
[-5;+5] 0.58% 0.20% 0.554 1.344 0.530 -1.117 25 
[-3;+3] 0.01% 0.02% 0.030 0.373 0.030 -0.121 25 
[0;0] 0.02% 0.13% 0.073 -0.151 0.075 -0.121 25 
[0;+2] 0.81% 0.36% 1.750* 1.503 1.848* -1.601 25 
[0;+3] 1.26% 0.76% 2.483** 2.275** 2.590** -2.112** 25 
[0;+5] 1.06% 0.81% 2.235** 2.101** 2.260** -1.843* 25 
[+1;+5] 1.04% 0.86% 1.960* 2.182** 1.938* -2.166** 25 
[-5;-1] -0.48% -0.05% -0.543 0.047 -0.566 -0.040 25 
     Panel B:Late Adopters  
[-10;+10] 0.65% -1.66% 0.257 0.062 0.266 -0.040 19 
[-5;+5] 0.21% 0.28% 0.176 -0.084 0.180 -0.040 19 
[-3;+3] 0.79% -0.18% 0.608 0.402 0.627 -0.121 19 
[0;0] -0.05% 0.29% -0.110 0.235 -0.112 -0.121 19 
[0;+2] -1.19% -1.02% -1.486 -1.518 -1.494 -1.449 19 
[0;+3] 0.20% -0.33% 0.252 0.101 0.256 -0.080 19 
[0;+5] -0.05% -1.03% -0.040 -0.351 -0.031 -0.644 19 
[+1;+5] 0.00% -1.04% 0.001 -0.389 0.010 -0.644 19 
[-5;-1] 0.26% 0.10% 0.269 0.302 0.273 -0.080 19 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 10 gives CARs for FIs according to country. Panel A shows all EPFIs 
headquartered in OECD countries; panel B shows all EPFIs headquartered in 
other countries. In this subsample, we find positive but mainly insignificant 
CARs for EPFIs in OECD countries. The exception is the event day itself, where 
we observe an AR of 0.45% with statistical significance at a 10% level. For the 
EPFIs in the other countries, we find a significantly negative AR of -1.25% on 
the event day. The event windows with more days reveal insignificantly positive 
or negative CARs. 
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Furthermore, we observe an opposite market reaction for this subsample on 
the event day only, but not on the event windows for the following days. We 
interpret this to suggest differing market reactions, but we cannot determine 
whether this result is caused solely by the EPFI OECD/other country differentia-
tion. 
Table 10: OECD/Other EP Adopter CARs  
This table reports the means and medians of subsamples of financial institutions’ cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around EP adoption. We test the CARs for statistical significance using a standard two-tailed t-test, a 
modified t-test as proposed by Boehmer et al. (1991), and a modified t-test as proposed by Johnson (1978). We 
test for statistical significance of the median CAR by using the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. Nobs denotes the 
number of financial institutions in the event study. 
  Cumulative Abnormal Return t-Test 
Boehmer et 
al. (1991) 
Test 
Johnson 
(1978) Test 
Wilcoxon  
Signed-
Rank Testa  
Event Window Mean Median t-value z-score j-value z-score Nobs 
     Panel A: OECD  
[-10;+10] -0.78% 0.68% -0.480 0.003 -0.495 -0.243 32 
[-5;+5] 0.34% 0.07% 0.372 1.006 0.362 -0.542 32 
[-3;+3] 0.37% 0.05% 0.641 0.801 0.649 -0.467 32 
[0;0] 0.45% 0.35% 1.874* 1.814* 1.882* -1.851* 32 
[0;+2] 0.06% 0.02% 0.116 -0.048 0.116 -0.150 32 
[0;+3] 0.71% 0.44% 1.542 1.565 1.562 -1.402 32 
[0;+5] 0.02% 0.06% 0.027 0.228 0.025 -0.206 32 
[+1;+5] -0.44% 0.07% -0.673 -0.471 -0.683 -0.112 32 
[-5;-1] 0.33% 0.07% 0.421 1.106 0.408 -1.085 32 
     Panel B: Other  
[-10;+10] 1.36% -2.55% 0.421 0.111 0.456 - 12 
[-5;+5] 0.62% 0.79% 0.421 0.047 0.421 - 12 
[-3;+3] 0.30% -0.29% 0.174 -0.122 0.196 - 12 
[0;0] -1.25% -1.54% -2.719** -2.267** -2.619** - 12 
[0;+2] -0.37% -0.81% -0.454 -0.725 -0.442 - 12 
[0;+3] 1.05% 0.22% 0.937 0.665 0.946 - 12 
[0;+5] 2.09% 0.25% 1.355 1.163 1.421 - 12 
[+1;+5] 3.34% 2.12% 1.977* 1.891* 2.136* - 12 
[-5;-1] -1.47% -3.33% -1.326 -1.338 -1.270 - 12 
***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
a We do not apply the Wilcoxon signed-rank test in Panel B because of the small number of observations. 
 
We find statistically significant positive CARs for financial institutions that 
adopted the EP between 2004 and April 2012. In fact, when differentiating by 
time of adoption, we note that positive CARs appear over different event win-
dows for early adopters. 
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It is important to note that, first, our results contradict those of earlier studies 
(e.g., Scholtens and Dam, 2007). Although we find smaller CARs than those for, 
e.g., merger and acquisition announcements, we believe we have proven the ex-
istence of abnormal market reactions. Second, our results reveal that, despite 
increased awareness of environmental and social issues, the capital market reac-
tions to EP adoption announcements weakened. We expected the capital markets 
to react more strongly to adoption announcements of later adopters than to early 
adopters, due to the intervening growth in environmental and social awareness. 
This development leads us to conclude that reputational risk may be a main 
driver of adopting a voluntary code of conduct such as the EP. This is strength-
ened by the fact that most of the early adopters are headquartered in OECD 
countries, as well as the breakdown in Table 10, which suggests that FIs in more 
competitive environments generate higher CARs. For this line of reasoning, we 
follow Wright and Rwabizambuga (2006), who argue that FIs in more competi-
tive environments have stronger motivations to manage their reputations. More-
over, “close-to-consumer” companies (a financial institution is typically close to 
the consumer) are more likely to invest in environmental or social activities than 
their counterparts (Haddock-Fraser and Tourell, 2010). The authors suggest that 
reputation with consumers/society is a business motivator for them. 
Moreover, there are several potential reasons for the marginal market reac-
tions. Scholtens and Dam (2007) argue that these announcements are “literally 
[…] no news,” because the banks are already conforming to the EP. Further-
more, the lack of transparency and accountability inherent in the EP – a source 
of the criticism by NGOs and other stakeholders – means that companies tend to 
neglect their tenets in regular daily business anyway. 
Scholtens and Dam (2007) also note that the share of total revenue generated 
from project finance is immaterial to the market value of financial institutions, 
and they question any link between “good moral standards and good business.” 
Transparency was improved in the 2006 revision – and it is likely to be rein-
forced again at the end of 2012 – but it is still prejudicial to accountability and 
obviously did not lead to a change in the results. We favor the first argument and 
follow, for example, Esty and Sesia (2010), who claim that the EP have become 
standard in project finance and do not indicate any unique attributes of a bank’s 
risk management. 
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4.4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
To analyze the CAR drivers in more detail, we next apply a cross-sectional 
analysis. We design two models to capture the possible influences of the various 
factors on the CAR. The first model includes the two identical dummy variables 
we used to create the subsamples in the event study. We therefore control for the 
validity of the prior results. In the second model, we add a set of control varia-
bles. The cross-sectional analysis includes twenty-eight companies, but sixteen 
had insufficient data available. 
Our model is expressed as: 
tttiti ROAEAEMCregiondtimedCAR 54321, )/(__    
ttt eAAABBAAPV  )()/( 76      (4.6) 
where CARi,t is the excess return observed for the [0;+3] event window; 
d_time is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the financial institution adopted the EP 
before July 2006, and 0 otherwise; d_region is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the financial institution is headquartered in an OECD country, and 0 otherwise; 
MC is the size of the financial institution measured as the logarithm of market 
capitalization; E/A is the financial structure measured as the ratio of equity to 
total assets; ROAE represents the operating profit measured as the return on av-
erage equity; PV/A stands for project volume/total assets in the year of adoption; 
and BBA-AAA is the difference between the monthly yield changes on corporate 
bonds rated BAA and AAA. MC, E/A, and ROAE are calculated in the quarter 
before adoption; BAA-AAA is considered in the quarter of adoption. 
Panel A in Table 11 reports the correlation coefficients for the dummy vari-
ables and a set of control variables. The correlations among the factors are rela-
tively low, except for the correlations between region of headquarter (d_region) 
and market capitalization (MC) and between d_region and BAA-AAA, which are 
considerably higher (0.6130/0.4895). As a further robustness check, we calcu-
late variance inflation factors (VIFs). VIFs higher than 5 indicate 
multicollinearity. The dummy d_region shows the highest VIF but does not ex-
ceed 5. Thus, we do not expect to find any multicollinearity among the varia-
bles. 
Panel B of Table 11 reports the results of the cross-sectional analysis. In 
model 1, the dummy variable d_time is positive and d_region is negative, but 
both variables are insignificant. While d_time confirms the event study results, 
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d_region contradicts the results in Table 11. We explain the insignificance of the 
coefficients by 1) the relatively small (but statistically significant) CARs in the 
event study, and 2) the different methodology applied. In the event study, we 
calculate a return in excess of the market, but in the cross-sectional analysis, the 
excess return is used only as a dependent variable. 
Table 11: CARs and Economic Variables 
Panel A: Correlation Coefficients for Economic Variables 
  d_time d_region MC E/A ROAE PV/A BBA-AAA
d_time  1.0000   
d_region  0.1997 1.0000   
MC  -0.0776 0.6130 1.0000   
E/A  0.0038 -0.3292 -0.0898 1.0000   
ROAE  -0.2830 -0.1988 -0.1593 0.0599 1.0000  
PV/A  -0.3185 -0.2397 -0.2365 0.3845 0.0102 1.0000 
BBA-AAA  -0.2821 -0.4895 -0.1252 0.2242 0.2494 -0.0594 1.0000
VIF  1.5960 2.5419 2.0338 1.4835 1.1836 1.6584 1.6238
Panel B: CARs [0+;3] Regressed on Economic Variables 
             Performance Variables  Control Variables 
 
Intercept d_time d_region MC E/A ROAE PV/A BBA-AAA
Model 1 0.0003 0.0123 -0.0036   
(Obs. 28) (0.0289) (1.3727) (-0.3289)    
 R²   0.0526 adj.R²   0.0014   
Model 2 -0.0328 0.0127 -0.0300 0.0163 -0.0036 0.0005 -0.3265 -0.0067
(Obs. 28) (-1.5173) (1.3173) (-2.3971) (2.6434) (-2.3376) (0.5038) (-1.2927) (-0.0582)
 R²   0.2775 adj.R²   0.0246   
This table reports performance and control variables. Panel A illustrates the correlations among variables. The 
dummy variables for time of adoption (d_time) and region of headquarter (d_region) measure the market reac-
tions for the different samples (event study). We use a set of five control variables. MC is a measure of the loga-
rithm of market capitalization; E/A denotes equity/total assets; ROAE denotes the return on average equity; 
PV/A denotes project volume/total assets; and BBA-AAA denotes monthly yield changes on corporate bonds 
rated BAA and AAA. We calculate variance inflation factors (VIF) to control for multicollinearity. Panel B 
reports the results from the multivariate regression on CARs [0;+3] of EP adopters. We apply an OLS regression 
with heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors. In model 1, we use an intercept and two performance varia-
bles; in model 2, we supplement with five control variables. The numbers in parentheses are t-values, and we 
report the number of observations (obs.), the R-square (R²), and the adjusted R-square (adj. R²) for each model. 
Data for the BBA-AAA variable come from Datastream; all other data come from Thomson One Banker. 
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In model 2, the factor loading for time does not change, but the region be-
comes statistically significant, and we observe significant factor loadings for 
MC and E/A. The positive factor loading (MC) could be explained by the greater 
public awareness of FIs with higher market capitalizations and therefore higher 
reputational pressure. The negative factor loading on E/A is plausible, because 
FIs with higher (financial) risk (i.e., lower E/A ratios) would have more to gain 
from additional risk management. 
4.4.3 MLA League Table Analysis 
The results reported in Panel A of Table 12 show that roughly three-quarters of 
the EPFIs were able to increase the amount of their global project debt over both 
the short and long term. In absolute values, we note mean and median increases 
for the short- (167.7%/45.1%) and long-term (417.3%/55.7%) analyses. While 
considering market development, the mean values remain positive, but the me-
dian values become negative in the short term (-24.7%), and even more strongly 
negative in the long term (-85.9%). We include median values in our examina-
tion because the mean values are likely to be driven by outliers.  
In all cases below, the medians are lower than the means, and therefore rep-
resent a more conservative estimate of relative increases. Note that EPFIs un-
derperformed the global market over both the short and long term. The same is 
true in developing countries (Panel B), although 63.0% (ST) and 78.4% (LT) of 
EFPIs were able to increase their project volume in this market. 
With regard to the number of projects, we find that the EPFIs clearly outper-
formed the global market. Most EPFIs increased their number of projects (glob-
ally and in developing countries). And from solely a global perspective, EPFIs 
increased their relative number of projects by 6.8% (ST) and 4.7% (LT). The 
numbers reported in Panel B, however, show that EPFIs in developing countries 
lag the overall project finance market. 
Furthermore, the numbers reveal that the adopters’ global market share 
showed virtually no change in the short term. But in the long term, 52.4% of 
EPFIs experienced positive trends. The average global market share in the three 
years following EP adoption was 0.016 percentage points higher than in the 
same period prior to adoption, with a 3.7% median absolute increase. This seem-
ingly small change becomes remarkable when it is assessed against overall mar-
ket development. In recent years, more players have begun competing for mar-
ket share, as indicated by a drop in the concentration ratio CR50. Between 2003 
and 2011, the concentration ratio in the global project finance MLA market de-
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clined from 83.0% to 76.4%. In developing countries, it decreased from 86.8% 
to 82.7%, and most EPFIs clearly lost market share over the short term, but re-
mained relatively stable over the longer period around EP adoption. 
Table 12: EPFI Performance – MLA League Table Analysis 
This table compares the volume of project debt, the number of projects, and the market share for EPFIs prior to and after EP 
adoption. Panel A includes all projects (e.g., globally), and Panel B includes only developing country projects. In the short-
term analysis (ST), project volume is compared for the years prior to and after adoption. In the long-term analysis (LT), 
average project volume for the three years following adoption is compared to average project volume for the three years 
preceding adoption. The numbers in parentheses correspond to the equivalent value in USD or number of projects. The aver-
age (absolute) increase denotes the increase/decrease of project volume, number of projects, and market share; the average 
(relative) increase denotes the increase/decrease of project volume, number of projects, and market share adjusted for market 
growth. N denotes the number of observations. 
Time Frame EPFIs with an Increase Average (absolute) Increase  
Average (relative) In-
crease  
Market 
Growth 
  Mean Median Mean Median 3/5 YGR 
  Project Volume  
     Panel A: Global  
ST (N=46) 71.7% 167.7% 
(US$m 397.1) 
45.1% 
(US$m 354.10) 
97.9% -24.7% 69.8% 
LT (N=42) 73.8% 417.3% 
(U.S.$m 723.05) 
55.7% 
(U.S.$m 611.61) 
275.7% -85.9% 141.6% 
 
     Panel B: Developing Countries  
ST (N=46) 63.0% 130.3% 
(U.S.$m 176.58) 
21.0% 
(U.S.$m 140.12) 
35.2% -74.1% 95.1% 
LT (N=37) 78.4% 669.6% 
(U.S.$m 404.48) 
102.3% 
(U.S.$m 273.03) 
464,9% -102.4% 204.7% 
 
  Number of Projects  
     Panel A: Global  
ST (N=46) 71.7% 71.0% (# 5.19) 56.2% (# 5.0) 21.6% 6.8% 49.4% 
LT (N=42) 76.2% 167.0%(# 9.09) 100.0% (# 6.3) 71.7% 4.7% 95.3% 
 
     Panel B: Developing Countries  
ST (N=49) 58.7% 47.8% (# 1.07) 11.1% (# 1.0) -7.1% -43.8% 54.9% 
LT (N=37) 78.4% 196.2%(# 3.23) 66.7% (# 1.7) 88.8% -40.7% 107.4% 
 
  Market Share  
     Panel A: Global  
ST (N=46) 50.0% 60.7% 
(-0.207) 
-1.7% 
(0.005) 
- 
 
- - 
LT (N=42) 52.4% 156.5% 
(-0.179) 
3.7% 
(0.016) 
- - - 
 
     Panel B: Developing Countries  
ST (N=46) 45.7% 34.9% 
(-0.076) 
-27.8% 
(-0.001) 
- - - 
LT (N=37) 45.9% 205.3% 
(-0.168) 
-5.0% 
(0.016) 
- - - 
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Distinguishing EPFIs by when they adopted the EP shows that early 
adopters performed better than later adopters. As Table 13 shows, EPFIs that 
adopted the EP before the 2006 revisions were able to increase their global mar-
ket share by 11.7%, compared to a -16.4% decrease for late adopters. In devel-
oping countries, the difference is even larger: The market share of early adopters 
increased by 15.5%, while that of late adopters decreased by -56.3%. It is not 
clear, however, whether adopting the EP contributed to the poor performance of 
institutions that only recently became EPFIs. It is possible that newer members 
are banks with weaker social and environmental risk management, and, as a re-
sult, weaker performance. They may have sought the benefits of the EP without 
true compliance, and early adopters may be more committed to code they were 
instrumental in shaping. Adverse selection might also have led to decreased in-
centives for above-average performers to join the initiative. 
Table 13: EPFI Performance – Market Share and Adoption Timing 
This table compares EPFIs’ global market share (Panel A) and their market share in developing countries (Panel B) before 
and after EP adoption. The short-term analysis compares the market share for the year preceding and after adoption. The 
long-term analysis compares average market share for the three years prior to and following adoption. The numbers in paren-
theses correspond to the difference (delta) between the means/medians before and after adoption. We develop two subsam-
ples for EPFI performance: 1) those that adopted the EP before the 2006 revision, and 2) those that adopted it afterward. N 
denotes the number of observations. 
Time Frame Time of EP Adop-tion 
EPFIs with an 
Increase Average Increase 
 Mean  Median  
  Market Share/Timing of Adoption 
     Panel A: Global 
ST (N=45) Before (N=28) 57.1% 97.2% (-0.155) 11.7% (0.080)
 After (N=18) 38.9% 0.1% (-0.289) -16.4% (-0.185)
LT (N=38) Before (N=28) 57.1% 139.3% (-0.088) 12.9% (0.139)
 After (N=10) 42.9% 190.8% (-0.361) -13.6% (-0.081)
 
     Panel B: Developing Countries 
ST (N=46) Before (N=24) 66.7% 104.7% (0.151) 15.5% (0.350)
 After (N=22) 22.7% -43.1% (-0.322) -56.3% (-0.139)
LT (N=37) Before (N=24) 62.5% 178.8% (-0.000) 13.1% (0.212)
 After (N=13) 15.4% 234.9% (-0.475) -46.8% (-0.092)
 
To summarize, our analysis of changes in three key figures, especially mar-
ket share, indicates that, globally, EPFIs tend to perform better than non-EP 
adopters. However, it is difficult to determine how much of this difference is 
attributable to EP adoption. For example, it is possible that institutions are suc-
cessful partly because they have the appropriate environmental and social risk 
management procedures in place, and may adopt the EP merely for signaling 
purposes. In this case, we would not attribute their success to the EP. Neverthe-
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less, our results allow for the conclusion that adopters outperform the global 
project finance market. 
We observe a different situation in developing countries. Here, EPFIs clear-
ly underperform in these markets, and thus tend to lose ground in exactly the 
regions where the EP are expected to have the strongest impact. But we again 
cannot assume this development is caused by the stricter EP guidelines. Instead, 
we note that many local banks entering the project finance market in developing 
countries and increasing their market share have not adopted the EP. One high-
profile example is the State Bank of India, which has been a leader in the MLA 
League Tables for the last two years and operates solely in their home market. 
On the other hand, it is not necessarily true that all projects in which none of the 
MLAs is an EPFI are non-EP-compliant. It is possible that a local bank acting as 
the MLA designs the project according to the EP so that it becomes attractive to 
a wider range of potential lenders. 
4.4.4 The Effects of the EP on the Project Finance Market 
EP-Compliant Projects 
Analyzing EPFIs as in the previous section does not allow for conclusions about 
what percent of project financings or of total project finance volume is EP-
compliant. In other words, we cannot draw any conclusions about the EP’s reach 
in the global project finance market. In the majority of projects, debt is provided 
by a club of banks, rather than by one bank alone. In cases where this club is 
comprised of EPFIs and non-EPFIs, some project volume is appropriated to non- 
EPFIs. Nevertheless, such a project must still be executed in adherence to the 
EP, assuming that the EPFIs honor their self-commitment. Thus, we see that 
sometimes a multitude of debt providers may be lending to supposedly sustaina-
ble projects, without being EP-compliant themselves. However, it is reasonable 
to assume that a project is EP-compliant as long as at least one EPFI is among 
its debt providers. 
To better assess what percent of projects is EP-compliant, and to facilitate 
the analyses in the next two sections, we obtain data on projects with volumes of 
U.S. $10 million or more, and a financial close between January 1, 2003, and 
December 31, 2011. The data come from the Dealogic Projectware database. As 
the results in Table 14 show, the EP consistently gained in influence during the 
first four years of inception. In 2006, 68.1% of all projects were EP-compliant, 
which corresponds to 83.5% of total project volume. 
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Table 14: EP Projects in the Global Project Finance Market 
 
     EP Projects      Other Projects 
Year Volume [US$m] a Number
a Avg. Volume [US$m]
Volume 
[US$m] Number 
Avg. Volume 
[US$m]
2003 53,539 (47.2%) 117 (33.5%) 457.6 59,864 232 258.0 
2004 129,564 (75.0%) 249 (56.8%) 520.3 43,214 189 228.6 
2005 147,571 (82.6%) 315 (64.5%) 468.5 30,995 173 179.2 
2006 194,071 (83.5%) 397 (68.1%) 488.8 38,279 186 205.8 
2007 227,390 (81.8%) 445 (67.1%) 511.0 50,582 218 232.0 
2008 248,744 (77.6%) 456 (63.5%) 545.5 71,742 262 273.8 
2009 206,835 (71.2%) 428 (60.1%) 483.3 83,609 284 294.4 
2010 220,084 (61.9%) 499 (58.4%) 441.0 135,363 356 380.2 
2011 280,126 (68.6%) 552 (56.8%) 507.5 128,198 420 305.2 
a The percent of EP projects in total annual project volume and total number of projects are in parentheses. 
 
Coinciding with the revision of the EP in 2006, however, this trend began to 
reverse. From 2007 onward, both the percent of EP projects in global project 
volume and the global number of projects – and accordingly the significance of 
the EP – declined steadily. In 2010, the number of EP and non-EP projects was 
almost equal. Furthermore, despite having remained relatively constant before, 
average EP project volume dropped markedly as well, undercutting the average 
volume of non-EP projects for the first time. The volume of EP-compliant pro-
jects rose again in 2011, but the percent of EP projects continues to decline. 
To explore the reasons for the decline, we divide projects by location. As 
Panel A of Table 15 shows, the share of EP projects and thus the relevance of 
the EP in the high-income OECD countries has remained nearly constant since 
2006. Approximately 83.4% of total project volume was attributed to EP-
compliant projects over the last five years. In developing countries, where it ex-
ceeded 90% in 2005, the share of EP project volume has steadily decreased, 
reaching a low of 34.9% in 2010, before beginning to increase again during 
2011. 
As Panel B shows, the drivers behind this trend are projects in Asia and, to a 
somewhat lesser extent, the Middle East. While project finance has gained in 
importance in these regions, however, EPFIs have lost market share, a result that 
parallels the result from the MLA League Table analysis. Here we see that local 
banks are increasingly dominating project finance markets, especially in India 
and China. Very few of these institutions have officially adopted the EP (alt-
hough, again, this does not necessarily mean that none of these projects are EP-
compliant). 
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Table 15: Share of EP Projects in the PF Market - by Location 
This table reports the percent of EP projects in the respective project finance markets. Each percentage is the quotient of EP 
project volume and total project volume in a given market and year. 
Panel A: Project Host Country Development Status  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Developed Countries 48.2% 73.9% 77.6% 83.3% 81.4% 83.8% 85.7% 86.8% 89.4% 
Developing Countries 45.7% 76.9% 90.1% 83.9% 82.2% 72.4% 61.8% 44.2% 53.1% 
 
Panel B: Project Region  
  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Western Europe 53.8% 72.4% 83.9% 77.5% 86.3% 85.7% 86.4% 91.5% 91.9% 
Eastern Europe 37.2% 87.2% 87.1% 64.3% 96.6% 88.7% 99.3% 95.3% 66.4% 
North America 38.9% 87.1% 79.6% 89.2% 85.3% 85.3% 90.0% 95.5% 95.9% 
South America 60.1% 63.6% 88.7% 77.3% 74.9% 94.7% 88.8% 92.8% 97.4% 
Asia 30.4% 41.6% 51.0% 73.2% 52.9% 52.0% 37.6% 18.2% 36.6% 
Middle East 59.2% 90.4% 96.5% 91.6% 93.9% 89.3% 91.3% 77.8% 69.8% 
Oceania 60.9% 94.1% 87.4% 86.9% 87.9% 93.7% 96.7% 84.3% 91.8% 
Africa 40.8% 51.8% 65.7% 95.0% 62.6% 60.9% 90.7% 90.6% 92.1% 
 
Technology may play another part in the apparent drop in relevance of the 
EP in developing countries. Some of the aforementioned banks, in the course of 
extending their business globally, may only recently have begun reporting their 
project finance deals to databases such as Dealogic Projectware. Thus, it is pos-
sible that the high percentages of EP projects in earlier years may have been 
overstated. 
Composition of Lending Syndicates in EP Projects 
One of the advantages of adopting the EP is simplified communication between 
all players in the project finance market. EPFIs may establish particularly close 
working relationships – perhaps through the working groups of the EP Associa-
tion – and be involved in lending syndicates that include no or only a few other 
institutions. An argument for this type of clustering behavior could be the shar-
ing of project costs and the tasks of maintaining the quality of social and envi-
ronmental assessments and action plans, as well as assistance in ensuring com-
pliance with a project’s timeline. EPFIs may even try to exclude non-adopters 
from syndicates, in an attempt to “force” adoption. In order to determine wheth-
er EPFIs do exhibit these types of behavior, we take a closer look at the compo-
sition of the lending syndicates in EP projects. 
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Figure 3 shows the number of EPFIs in syndicates of EP projects that closed 
from 2009 to 2011. The overall picture remained relatively constant over the 
three years. The majority of all EP projects involved one to three EPFIs as lend-
ers, with twenty projects having forty-five or more EPFIs. 
 
 
Figure 3: Number of EPFIs in Loan Syndicates of EP Projects (Source: Dealogic 
Projectware) 
There is thus some indication that EPFIs work smoothly together. However, 
to assess whether this collaboration is outside the norm, and whether it can be 
viewed as clustering behavior or as excluding non-EP compliant firms from 
syndicates, we must examine the number of non-EPFIs as well. Table 16 gives 
an overview of the composition of lending syndicates in recent years. 31.4% of 
all EP projects were supported with debt from EPFIs only. The vast majority of 
these projects had only one lender, so we see no sign of clustering there. We 
note 154 projects that included two or three EPFIs only, with no other lenders. 
However, this is a normal practice, and thus would not indicate increased clus-
tering among EPFIs. There are ten EP projects in which six to nine EPFIs are the 
only lenders, which is a remarkable occurrence. But they remain the exception. 
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Table 16: Composition of Lending Syndicates in EP Projects 
This table reports the numbers of EFPIs and non-EFPIs in lending syndicates of EP projects that closed from 
2009 to 2011. 
Non-EPFIs 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 > 9 
EP
FI
s 
1 264 177 73 40 13 8 6 4 3 2 8 40.4%
2 107 94 44 34 12 12 6 4 8 2 5 22.2%
3 47 50 32 20 15 4 4 3 1 2 2 12.2%
4 26 29 22 20 9 10 0 3 0 0 2 8.2% 
5 10 18 11 7 11 1 3 2 0 1 2 4.5% 
6 5 13 11 7 4 5 5 4 2 0 4 4.1% 
7 4 12 2 2 4 1 3 1 0 1 1 2.1% 
8 0 7 5 4 7 4 0 1 2 0 1 2.1% 
9 1 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 0 1 4 1.3% 
> 9 0 4 4 7 10 2 2 2 3 3 8 3.0% 
    31.4% 27.4% 13.9% 9.7% 5.9% 3.3% 2.1% 1.7% 1.3% 0.8% 2.5%   
 
Moreover, the distribution of projects in which both EPFIs and non-EPFIs 
are lenders does not reveal any abnormalities. The shaded grey diagonal line in 
Table 16 that indicates projects with an equal number of EPFIs and non-EPFIs 
covers 268 projects. And the number of projects at the lower left of the diagonal 
(436 projects) is not significantly larger than that at the upper right of the diago-
nal (311 projects). Of the forty-five projects involving more than nine EPFIs, 
eighteen also involve six or more non-adopters. These projects are very large, 
however, so it would not be unexpected to find a high number of leading project 
finance institutions.  
In summary, we find no evidence that EPFIs tend to collaborate mostly with 
each other, or that they exclude non-adopters from the lending syndicates of EP 
projects. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Recent increases in project finance volume, combined with a growing public 
awareness of environmental and social issues, has raised the question of whether 
and how guidelines such as the Equator Principles can increase their impact on 
EPFIs in particular and the project finance industry in general. Our analysis de-
pends on the temporal development of the impact. We contribute to the existing 
body of literature on the EP by, first, exploring whether their impact has 
changed over time, i.e., whether the capital markets reacted differently to early 
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EP adopters than to later adopters. Second, we analyze the performance of 
EPFIs in the project finance industry. Third, we identify trends among EP pro-
jects. 
For this analysis, we used several different approaches, beginning with an 
event study methodology combined with a cross-sectional analysis. The sample 
in our event study was originally comprised of eighty-five financial institutions 
that announced EP adoption between 2003 and April 2012. Next, we conducted 
an MLA League Table Analysis, followed by a comparison of global project 
finance data. The data for the League Table Analysis and the comparison came 
from the Dealogic Projectware database for the 2000-2011 period. 
We examined positive abnormal returns for financial institutions that an-
nounced EP adoption between 2004 and April 2012. When we examine FIs ac-
cording to time of adoption, we find positive CARs over different event win-
dows for early adopters. Thus, our results contradict those of earlier studies 
(e.g., Scholtens and Dam, 2007). We believe that conditional variance in stock 
returns explains this discrepancy. Our results also reveal that, despite increased 
awareness of environmental and social issues, the capital markets do not react 
more strongly now to EP adoption announcements. Thus, we examined no ab-
normal returns for the latest announcements. We expected capital market reac-
tions to be stronger for later adopters than for earlier ones, due to the growth in 
consciousness of environmental and social issues. Following Wright and 
Rwabizambuga (2006), who argue that FIs in more competitive environments 
tend to be more careful of their reputations, we thus conclude that reputational 
risk is one of the main drivers of adopting a voluntary code of conduct such as 
the EP. 
Using the League Table Analysis, we examined project volume, number of 
projects, and market share, and find that, from a global perspective, EPFIs tend 
to outperform non-adopters. This trend was especially pronounced for the num-
ber of projects and market share. When focusing on developing countries, we 
find the opposite: EPFIs clearly underperform non-adopters. We believe there 
are two main reasons for this difference.  
First, successful FIs, who likely already have the appropriate environmental 
and social risk management procedures in place, will tend to adopt the EP more 
readily, but perhaps only for signaling or reputational purposes. Moreover, most 
successful financial institutions are headquartered in OECD countries. This is in 
line with the reputational risk management theory and recent interview-based 
results from, e.g., Conley and Williams (2011) and Macve and Chen (2010). On 
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the other hand, the underperformance may be the result of a high number of lo-
cal banks entering the project finance markets in developing countries. This 
would increase the market share of non-adopters, not because they are more 
successful, but because they are dividing the market into smaller parts. 
When analyzing projects instead of FIs, we observe a steady increase in vol-
ume and number of EP-compliant projects from 2003 to 2006. However, begin-
ning in 2006, that share decreases rather dramatically. This trend is attributable 
to a strong decline in EP projects in developing countries, although the percent 
in developed countries (approximately 80%) has remained consistently high 
from 2006 to 2011. This supports our earlier results that using the EP as a (repu-
tational) risk management tool may be even more effective in highly competi-
tive environments such as OECD countries (Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006). 
The most critical points in the League Table Analysis are also applicable here. 
The fact that local banks have become more involved in the project finance 
market, especially in other countries, and the fact that those banks may not be 
reporting to the primary project finance databases yet, could bias the results. 
We find no evidence of EPFIs excluding non-adopters from lending syndi-
cates. Most syndicates feature an equal distribution of EPFIs and non-adopters, 
which suggests that EP compliance by a specific bank is not a crucial require-
ment for collaborating in lending syndicates. This argument is somewhat weak-
ened, however, when we consider that projects must technically be EP-
compliant if even one of the banks is an EPFI. 
Managerial implication is that it is beneficial for FIs to adopt voluntary 
codes of conduct as the EP. Besides, a positive impact on company’s market 
value Marín et al., (2012) underlines our results by showing that CSR activities 
have a positive effect on competitiveness. The authors even argue that in partic-
ular a proactive strategy compared to an otherwise only active strategy strength-
ens the competitiveness of the company. This goes in line with our results that 
early adopters show significant positive abnormal returns and suggests an – at 
least active – engagement of FIs in voluntary codes of conducts or disclosures 
pertaining to environmental and social issues. Additionally, Heikkurinen (2010) 
supports our results as he finds that adopting an environmentally responsible 
identity can enhance the firm’s strategic position. This is also supported by Melo 
and Mansouri (2011) who suggest companies should “adopt the proposals of 
environmental non-governmental organizations and closely follow public opin-
ion” in order to influent profitability. Financial Institutions should be encour-
aged to foster and adopt responsible identities. In particular, taking into account 
the banking crisis, those strategies could be a key to success. 
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The role of the IFC offers governments and NGOs a unique opportunity to 
enhance the implementation of environmental and social issues in project fi-
nance performances standards. But Wright (2012) argues that governments are 
tempted to vote against a draft once they expect a negative impact on inflow of 
long-term capital. Our results encourage public policy to develop and foster 
standard settings pertaining to environmental and social issues in the financial 
sector. An increased market value and the outperformance of adopters provide 
arguments in favor of strengthening the efforts of both public policy and FIs to 
cooperate and expand the scope of performance standards not only in project 
finance, but also in e.g. financial advisory products. 
Further research would be needed to determine the impact of the Equator 
Principles on the project finance market. And more reliable data is required – 
especially for developing countries – to control for potential biases caused by 
the lack of data. The next round of EP revisions may help overcome this issue. 
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Appendix 
Table 17: Financial Institutions that have Adopted the EP 
Financial Institution Date of  Adoption 
Ea
rly
 a
do
pt
er
 
O
EC
D
 Financial Institution Date of Adoption 
Ea
rly
 a
do
pt
er
 
O
EC
D
 
ABN Amro Groupa  06/04/2003 1 1 EFIC 03/03/2009 0 1 
Absa Bank Limiteda 10/22/2009 0 0 Eksport Kredit Fonden 05/14/2004 1 1 
Access Bank 06/04/2009 0 0 Eksportfinans ASA 09/01/2010 0 1 
Ahli United Banka 05/02/2011 0 0 Ex-Im Bank 03/31/2011 0 1 
ANZ 12/15/2006 0 1 Export Development Canada 10/26/2007 0 1 
Arab African Inter. Bank 01/25/2009 0 0 FirstRand Limiteda,b 07/13/2009 0 0 
ASN Banka 11/25/2009 0 1 FMO 10/19/2005 1 1 
Aterios Capital 03/01/2012 0 0 Fortisa 02/17/2006 1 1 
B. Bilbao Vizcaya Argentariaa,b 05/18/2004 1 1 HBOS/ Bank of Scotland 08/15/2006 0 1 
Banco Bradescoa,b 09/08/2004 1 0 HSBC Holdingsa,b 09/04/2003 1 1 
Banco Comercial Portugues 01/02/2006 1 1 HVB Group 06/04/2003 1 1 
B. de Galicia y Buenos Aires 03/19/2007 0 0 Industrial Banka 10/31/2008 0 0 
Banco de la República Oriental 
del Uruguay 
01/03/2008 0 0 ING Groepa,b 06/23/2003 1 1 
Banco do Brasil 03/03/2005 1 0 Intesa Sanpaolo 08/04/2006 0 1 
Banco Espírito Santoa,b 08/16/2005 1 1 JPMorgan Chasea,b 04/25/2005 1 1 
Banco Itáu BBA 08/12/2004 1 0 KBC Banka,b 01/27/2004 1 1 
Banco Mercantil del Nortea 03/12/2012 0 1 KfW 03/03/2008 0 1 
Banco Sabadella 09/28/2011 0 1 La Caixa 03/19/2007 0 1 
Banco Santandera,b 04/30/2009 0 1 Lloyds Banking Groupa,b 01/31/2008 0 1 
Bancolombiaa 12/11/2008 0 0 Manulife Financial 05/11/2005 1 1 
Bank Muscata,b 08/20/2007 0 0 MCC Bank 07/29/2003 1 1 
Bank of America Corporationa,b 04/15/2004 1 1 Millenium PCB 01/02/2006 1 1 
Bank of Montreal 09/15/2005 1 1 Mizuho Corporate Banka 10/27/2003 1 1 
Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi 12/22/2005 1 1 National Australia Banka,b 10/25/2007 0 1 
Barclaysa,b 06/04/2003 1 1 Natixisa 12/30/2010 0 1 
BMCE Banka 05/10/2010 0 0 Nedbanka 11/10/2005 1 0 
BMO Financial Group 09/15/2005 1 1 NIBC Banka 11/09/2010 0 1 
BNP Paribasa,b 10/24/2008 0 1 Nordea Bank 02/21/2007 0 1 
CAIXA Economica Federal 03/19/2007 0 0 Rabobank Group 06/04/2003 1 1 
Caja Navarra 01/09/2006 1 1 Royal Bank of Canadaa,b 07/21/2003 1 1 
Calyon 08/18/2003 1 1 Royal Bank of Scotlanda 06/04/2003 1 1 
CIBCa,b 12/03/2003 1 1 Scotiabanka,b 01/18/2005 1 1 
CIBanco 03/07/2012 0 1 SEB 04/03/2007 0 1 
CIFI 04/06/2007 0 0 Société Généralea,b 09/03/2007 0 1 
Citigroupa,b 06/04/2003 1 1 St. Bank of South Africaa,b 02/02/2009 0 0 
CORPBANCA 07/19/2007 0 1 Standard Chartereda,b 10/08/2003 1 1 
Credit Suisse Groupa,b 06/04/2003 1 0 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking 
Corp.a,b 
02/23/2006 1 1 
DekaBank 03/01/2011 0 1 TD Bank Financial Group 04/12/2007 0 1 
Dexiaa,b 09/18/2003 1 1 Unibancoa,b 06/01/2004 1 0 
DnB NOR Banka,b 05/29/2008 0 1 Wells Fargo Banka 07/11/2005 1 1 
Dresdner Bank 08/18/2003 1 1 WestLB 06/04/2003 1 1 
E + Co. 10/30/2006 0 1 Westpac Banking Corp.a,b 06/04/2003 1 1 
Ecobanc Transnational Inter. 01/01/2012 0 0     
a/b Financial institutions for which stock market data was available and that were included in the event 
study/cross-sectional analysis. 
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